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Interorganizational ExchangeINTRODUCTION
Sociological research has left little doubt that organizations operate within
extensive networks of other organizations.Most work has focused on coarse
substantive relationships among organizations: patterns of joint ventures,
strategic alliances, and other cooperative arrangements (Walker, Kogut, and
Shan1997;Powell et al. 2005); interorganizationalnetworks formedby friend-
ship or kinship among managers (Ingram and Roberts 2000; Ingram and
Lifschitz 2006); links by shared directors (Galaskiewicz and Wasserman 1981;
Palmer, Friedland, and Singh 1986; Roy and Bonacich 1988; Vedres and Stark
2010), founders (Hillmann and Aven 2011), members (Rosenthal et al. 1985;
Cornwell and Harrison 2004), or investors (Hillmann 2008); or shared rela-
tionships with financial institutions (Mizruchi 1992; Moody and White 2003)
or interorganizational coalitions (Ingram, Robinson, and Busch 2005; Rosen-
kopf and Schleicher 2008; Torfason and Ingram 2010). Instead of studying
substantive relationships, some researchers have represented interorgani-
zational networks by directly measuring interactive behaviors amongorga-
nizations. For example, they record an interorganizational “tie” to represent
communication observed amongmanagers (Baker and Faulkner 1993; Fer-
nandez and Gould 1994), organizations cosponsoring an event (Bearman
andEverett 1993; Baldassarri andDiani 2007), firms lendingmoney or trad-
ingpersonnel (Keister2001),companiesgivingcongressional testimonyonthe
samepolicy issue (DreilingandDarves2011),portsbeingconnectedbyaship-
ping trip (EriksonandBearman2006), or gangsmurderingmembers of other
gangs (Papachristos, Hureau, and Braga 2013). Even researchers observing
organizational exchange events have conventionally aggregated these inter-
actions over time into “ties,”which they take as proxies for temporally stable
and temporally continuous relationships (Kitts 2014; DeNooy 2015) defined
on a time interval. In this way, interwoven sequences of interaction events
are frozen into fixed structures (“networks”) amenable to conventional social
network analysis tools.
Although the concept of social structure seems to presuppose some stabil-
ity in interaction patterns, the fine-grained sequence and timing of interac-
tion also has profound importance for phenomena of interest to social scien-
tists, such as diffusion and influence (Moody 2002;Moody,McFarland, and
Bender-DeMoll 2005). Our work aims to address long-standing gaps in the
understandingofhowinterorganizationalnetworkschangeover time(Levin-
thal and Fichman 1988; Baker and Faulkner 2002; Rosenkopf and Padula124537 and IZK0Z1_160627. The content is solely the responsibility of the authors. We
thankDiegoF.Leal,DonaldTomaskovic-Devey, JohnLeviMartin,RonaldBurt, Robert
Faulkner, and the AJS reviewers forhelpful comments.Anearlier versionwaspresented at
the 2013 American Sociological Association conference. Direct correspondence to James
Kitts, Department of Sociology, University of Massachusetts, 200 Hicks Way, Amherst,
Massachusetts 01003. E-mail: jkitts@soc.umass.edu
851
This content downloaded from 144.173.023.038 on March 15, 2019 03:26:37 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
American Journal of Sociology
All2008). Notably, the temporal aggregation of exchange events reveals latent
structures of exchange butmay obscure our view of the generative forces un-
derlying those structures. Even research that has considered the dynamics of
interorganizational networks (as appearance or disappearance of ties) has
yet to discriminate among time horizons in which different network mech-
anisms unfold. Empirical studies implicitly assume that mechanisms of net-
work evolution operate in synchrony anddepend onhistory in the sameway.
Finally, work focusing on local patterns in networks (e.g., reciprocity, transi-
tivity) in isolation has limited potential to illuminate the macrostructures
that emerge in organizational populations, communities, and fields.
We aim to understand the phenomenon of interorganizational resource
exchange by focusing directly on the interdependent temporal dynamics of
exchange events as they unfold in time. Avoiding temporal aggregation
of exchange events into ties allows us to shed new light on the generative
forces underlying exchange, gives purchase on identifying mechanisms,
and offers a first look into the time horizons by which these mechanisms un-
fold. Directly analyzing exchange behavior also brings us in closer theoreti-
cal dialog with rich qualitative interpretations (Malinowski 1920; Mauss
[1925] 1990; Levi-Strauss 1944) and informal discursive theory (Homans
1958; Blau 1964) on exchange dynamics. Methodologically, our approach
draws on cutting-edge methods of relational event analysis (Butts 2008; Pilny
et al. 2016; Stadtfeld, Hollway, and Block 2017), building on traditions in
event history analysis (Tuma, Hannan, and Groeneveld 1979; Hannan 1989)
and sequence analysis (Abbott 1990, 1995; Stark and Vedres 2006).
Here we take a first step toward an elementary structural theory of inter-
organizational social exchange.We focus on just one type of exchange among
organizations, which has proven important to our understanding of inter-
personal relationships: voluntary unilateral transfers of resources (“giving”).
Unlike negotiated exchange (where both parties directly trade some goods
or pay some price for services), in this case a unilateral transfer of resources
from A to B may or may not be followed by a transfer from B to A at a later
time. This situation of independent sequential choices is called reciprocal ex-
change (Molm 2010; Molm, Whitham, and Melamed 2012) or reciprocity
(Homans 1958; Gouldner 1960; Blau 1964).
In developing this theory, we distinguish two basic bonding mechanisms
that may underlie the process of reciprocal exchange among organizations
(Laumann andMarsden 1982): first, organizations depend on each other for
resources, and this dependence is greater if an exchange partner is an impor-
tant source of resources (relative to other partners). When an organization
gives more to exchange partners that are relatively important senders of re-
sources to it (Emerson 1962; Cook 1977; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978), we call
this dependence reciprocation. By contrast, organizational embedding im-
plies that as organizations give a larger portion of their outgoing resources852
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Interorganizational Exchangeto particular partners, their operations and infrastructures gradually inter-
weave: they develop better communication among personnel and more de-
tailed and accurate information about partners’ capabilities, and they grad-
ually develop shared routines that make their exchanges more efficient and
reliable than alternative neglected partners (Uzzi 1996). This gradual pro-
cess yields a bias to give more to partners to which one has given in the past
and a reciprocal bias to give to partners that have given relatively more to
oneself in the past.We refer to these two forms of stickiness in exchange due
to focus of activity as embedding inertia and embedding reciprocation.
Previous work on power and dependence has always conceived of those
processes as operating on contemporaneous opportunity structures (i.e., the
partners currently available; Cook 1977; Bonacich and Bienenstock 2009).
Previous qualitative work on development of organizational relationships
through reciprocation has informally described a process that plays out over
time, even though analytical lenses rarely allowed direct analysis of tempo-
ral dynamics. Drawing on these earlier insights, we demonstrate that these
twomechanisms of reciprocation (dependence and embedding) operate over
distinct timehorizons. Specifically, reciprocationdue to organizational embed-
ding develops gradually over a long time horizon, whereas reciprocation due
to resource dependence operates contemporaneously on a set of active part-
ners. This approach extends efforts to disentangle organizational dynamics
operating in the short and long term (Hannan 1998; Kitts 2009).
Weapply the theory to transfersofpatients inacommunityof regionalhos-
pital organizations in the Abruzzo region of Italy over a period of five years
(2003–7). In the Italian health care system, transferring patients implies flows
of government funding (and other resources, as we will describe) from the
patient-sending hospital to the patient-receiving hospital, so interhospital
patient transfers in the Italian system can be represented as sender-initiated
unilateral resource transfers. Our analysis of reciprocation in this system re-
veals a variety of clear patterns that are intelligible in light of our theory. As
predicted, we observe both embedding and dependence reciprocation and
show that the former develops over longer time horizons, whereas the lat-
ter is responsive to contemporaneous structures reflected on a shorter time
horizon.
We present analytical extensions that validate our interpretations by
showing how interorganizational exchange develops differently in competi-
tive and noncompetitive exchange settings. Sending patients in competitive
contexts (within the same medical specialty area and within the nearby geo-
graphic area) represents “deference” to competitors. Sending patients in non-
competitive contexts (across specialty areas and to distant geographic areas)
allows for “complementary” exchanges.We show that the dynamics of recip-
rocation differ in intelligible ways for deference exchanges and complemen-
tary exchanges: for deference transfers within competitive exchange set-853
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Alltings, we observe little or no reciprocation. For complementary transfers
across exchange settings and geographic regions, we see reciprocation devel-
oping following the logics of dependence and embedding described above.
Because competition diminishes continuously as geographic distance in-
creases (Baum and Mezias 1992; Baum and Haveman 1997; Sorenson and
Stuart 2001), we are able to demonstrate that reciprocation increases grad-
ually as distance increases and show that processes of embedding and de-
pendence drive reciprocation as competition diminishes.
Explicitly modeling the dynamics of social interaction will provide pur-
chase on the emergence of community-level patterns, such as generalized ex-
change (Bearman1997;Molm,Collett, andSchaefer 2007) and status hierar-
chy (Chase1980;Gould2002;Lynn,Podolny,andTao2009)as thesebroader
systems develop through the confluence of dyadic (reciprocation) and triadic
(closure) processes. The local dynamics that we theorize and analyze may
then constitute a microlevel substrate that can lead to macrolevel structures.
For deference transfers in competitive domains, we show that local exchange
dynamics can lead to hierarchy formation in the population; for complemen-
tary transfers across specialties, we show that local exchange dynamics can
lead to generalized exchange.
In summary,moving from conceptualizing “interorganizational networks”
as reified structures to directly studying dynamics of resource transfers in
time allows us to develop a deeper understanding of interorganizational ex-
change. Drawing on established literatures in resource dependence and in
theories of organizational relationships, we develop novel implications for
temporal dynamics of exchange. Specifically, we show that two distinct log-
ics of reciprocation, dependence and embedding, operate over different time
horizons and are contingent on the context of exchange (complementary vs.
competitive). Importantly, we provide a coherent account that makes these
nuanced patterns intelligible. Directly theorizing the dynamics of exchange
in this way further allows a flexible and seamless bridge betweenmicro- and
macrostructures, including the relational foundations of hierarchy and gen-
eralized exchange.THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Although extant research on organizational networks has derived impor-
tant insights from assuming the stability of interorganizational ties (Lomi
and Pattison 2006), these networks do change over time as organizations
establish (Beckman, Haunschild, and Phillips 2004; Rosenkopf and Padula
2008) or dissolve ties (Levinthal andFichman 1988). Because the presence of
prior network ties between organizations affects the evolution of future ties,
researchhas focused on the endogenous dynamics of interorganizational net-854
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Interorganizational Exchangeworks (Gulati and Gargiulo 1999). This research has produced at least three
general empirical regularities that we take as starting points (for a general
review, seeRivera, Soderstrom, andUzzi 2010). Thefirst regularity concerns
the inertia of network ties, or tie repetition. Current ties are more likely to be
observed today if they existed in the past (Podolny 1994; Uzzi and Lancaster
2004), a pattern often interpreted as deriving from the reproductive forces of
social structure or as a behavioral response to uncertainty and risk (Gulati
1995). The second regularity concerns reciprocity. A tie is more likely to be
directed from one organization to another if the latter organization has di-
rected a tie to the first (Larson 1992; Lincoln, Gerlach, and Takahashi 1992;
Uzzi 1996)—an outcome consistent with basic behavioral principles of re-
lational contract enforcement (Fehr, Gachter, and Kirchsteiger 1997). The
third regularity concerns the tendency of organizations sharing common
partners to bedirectly connected (Uzzi 1997;Kogut andWalker 2001;Baum,
Shipilov, andRowley 2003). Such patterns of triad closure are consistentwith
basic principles of organizational bonding (Laumann andMarsden 1982).
Inertia, reciprocity, and closure are often interpreted as social mechanisms
capable of reproducing the aggregate regularities typically observed in em-
pirical research (Powell et al. 2005), but key questions remain: How stable
are these regularities?How do they change over time and onwhat timescale?
Howdo these inferred social ties map onto underlying interaction behaviors?
While occasionally recognized, such crucial issues are rarely addressed in em-
pirical studies of organizational networks. Indeed, researchers have applied
the same lenses and analytical tools to macrolevel and coarse-grained phe-
nomena such as interorganizational relations determined by ownership and
procurement that may evolve slowly over years (Gerlach 1997), as well as
to microlevel and fine-grained phenomena such as radio communications
among emergency responders that evolve over timescales ofminutes or even
seconds (Butts, Petrescu-Prahova, and Cross 2007). Conventional tools of
network analysis tend to be agnostic to timescales, so developing a rigorous
consideration of networkdynamics requires us to think deeply about how re-
lational processes play out over time.
Our focus on the temporal dynamics of reciprocation behavior builds on
classic traditionsofqualitative research. Indeed,decadesofwork inexchange
theory have suggested that the temporal dynamics of reciprocal giving be-
havior play an important role in relationship formation, for individuals,
clans, and tribes. Much of this work has employed qualitative fieldwork or
informal reasoning and analysis, such as the classics in cultural anthropology
(Malinowski 1920; Levi-Strauss 1944; Mauss 1990) and in sociological ex-
change theory (Simmel 1950; Homans 1958; Gouldner 1960). More recently,
work in economics and evolutionary biology has explored the dynamics of
reciprocation via game theory and laboratory experiments (Axelrod 1984;855
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AllBoyd and Richerson 1988; Fehr and Gachter 2000; Gintis 2000). Recent ex-
perimental (Bienenstock and Bianchi 2004; Kuwabara and Sheldon 2012;
Molm et al. 2012) and observational (Willer, Sharkey, andFrey 2012) studies
havepushed the frontiers of our understanding of interpersonal reciprocity.
However, although there is interest in broadening the scope conditions of
social psychological theories of reciprocity to include macro-organizational
phenomena (Berger, Eyre, and Zelditch 1998;Molm 2010;Molm,Melamed,
and Whitham 2013), it is not clear that affective or cognitive mechanisms
developed to account for reciprocity at the interpersonal level will also apply
to reciprocal exchange among large formal organizations over long time-
scales. In any case, despite the long-standing interest in applying exchange
theory to organizational networks, an analysis of the temporal dynamics of
the structure of reciprocal exchange among organizations has never been
performed. Thus, we introduce a set of novel theoretical questions (indeed,
a new kind of question to ask) as well as a set of new findings that will drive
further theoretical development.Embedding and Dependence Reciprocation
in Transfer of Resources among Organizations
Our primary focus in the behavioral dynamics of interorganizational rela-
tions is on the phenomenon of reciprocation in exchange among organiza-
tions. Rather than studying reciprocity as a binary and static trait of a tie
(i.e., reciprocated or unreciprocated), we examine reciprocation as a dy-
namic social process that takes the form of history dependence in exchange
patterns.
For brevity, we refer to one organization giving resources to another or-
ganization as “giving,” but this is shorthand for “unilateral voluntary trans-
fer of resources, outside the context of negotiated quid pro quo exchange.” It
need not entail the semantic or cultural baggage of “gifts” in the interpersonal
social world. To the extent that organizational resource transfers might be
interpreted like conventional gifts, this invokes an analogy to classical cul-
tural anthropology research (Mauss 1990), contemporary comparative and
ethnographic research (Yang 1994; McLean 2007), and experimental social
psychology research (Bienenstock and Bianchi 2004) on gift giving and im-
plies cultural scripts such as a norm of reciprocity. A strong version of that
interpretation is not plausible here, given that formal organizations do not
“feel” obliged to reciprocate, and even reputational concerns would be com-
pelling only if interorganizational resource transfers are public and salient.
However, whether subtle tendencies to maintain and reciprocate resource
transfers may operate at the organizational level through embedding of per-
sonnel, information flows, and operating routines—a process we call orga-856
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Interorganizational Exchangenizational embedding—is a distinct question that we are in a position to
address.
Thinking of reciprocation dynamically, as a form of history dependence
in behavior, generalizes the concept to allow richer theory. Resources trans-
ferred from actor i to actor jmay depend in nuanced ways on temporal pat-
terns of past transfers between j and i or even transfers between either actor
and third parties k. This lens also allows us to consider how this historymay
be viewed andweighted in different ways by the actors. This extends an ob-
servation by Abbott (2001, p. 259) that what actors see as social structure is
in fact a memory and reckoning of a dynamic pattern of past events: “Since
at any time the given structure of relations is all that exists . . . all influence of
the past works through the shape given to those relations by the actions of
the past. Memory of course provides a symbolic record of the past, which
then reinterprets and reshapes it as a foundation for current action. But in
the first instance, social structure is itself the memory of the social process.”
Weconceptualize twodistinct socialprocesses thatdrivechanges inexchange
rates over time: organizational embedding and resource dependence.
Bytheembeddingprocess, reciprocal resource transfers representagradual
buildupofan interorganizational “relationship”over time. Itmaybe tempting
to view this relationship in psychological terms, butwe need not assume that
an organization has an affective attachment to another organization, feels
grateful for a transfer, or feels loyal as a partner. Two organizations collabo-
rating on mutual projects will develop routines and habits for cooperation
and coordination and build acquaintances and familiarity at the personnel
level that reduces transaction costs or uncertainty and facilitates organiza-
tional learning (Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr 1996; Keister 2001; Uzzi and
Lancaster 2004). Meanwhile, successful exchanges will reduce uncertainty,
and decision makers will build confidence in the competence and reliability
of regular exchange partners.
Ouruseof the termembedding essentially represents a formofdyadic iner-
tia in organizational exchange (Rivera et al. 2010), whereby an organization
will tend to repeat transactions or exchangeswith the samepeer organization
over time. Previous work on embedding among organizations emphasizes
the interpersonal familiarity, affective bonds, and trust that build among
personnel over time (Uzzi 1996). Personal affective attachments may indeed
play a role in the interorganizational processes thatwe study, butwedevelop
the theory at a higher level of abstraction and generality.When organization j
elects to send resources to organization i, this collaborationmay develop orga-
nizational bonds including shared routines and social and operational infra-
structure for managing the ongoing exchange. The more focused j is on ex-
changing with i, the more j adapts its operations to specialize for exchange
with i (reducing uncertainty on performance and operations).857
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AllEmbedding inertia.—Actor iwill give more to peer j now if in the past i
has focused its giving on j (i has sent a greater proportion of its outgoing re-
sources to j than to others).
An important insight we add here is that this relational focus developing
gradually through habits, routines, or channels of communication may lead
to resources flowing in either direction. Thus, gradual embedding and spe-
cialization is also manifested as reciprocation.
Embedding reciprocation.—Actor iwill givemore to peer j if in the past j
has focused its giving on i ( j has sent a greater proportion of its outgoing re-
sources to i than to others).
By the dependence process, reciprocation reflects a current need for re-
sources through an exchange partner (vs. the availability of resources through
alternative partners). This connects directly to views on dependence in so-
ciological exchange theory (Emerson 1962; Cook 1977), which are predicated
on the notion of rational actors negotiating exchanges while embedded in
networks, and to work in the resource dependence tradition in organization
theory (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). In both traditions, actors are seen as
making exchange choices based on the set of available alternatives, and this
contemporaneous structure of options results in power for some actors that
is derived from the dependence of others.
In contemporary network exchange theory (Willer 1999), the actor opti-
mizes its welfare by negotiating with network neighbors over terms of ex-
change (making offers, which may be accepted or rejected), and the mech-
anism driving power in these negotiated exchanges is the risk of exclusion.
The network is an experimentally induced opportunity structure that sets
the context for these bilateral negotiations, and the researchers are typically
interested in the effect of exogenous network structures on realized power in
exchange (measured as the magnitude of offers received).
Our approach is different.We are not directly interested in the exogenous
opportunity structure, andwe studyanempirical populationwhere there are
no such hard constraints, so organizationsmay choose freely where to trans-
fer resources.We also do not focus on negotiated exchanges (such as organi-
zations tradingmoney for other goods), and in fact we study a highly regulated
organizational context in which exchange values are fixed by authorities.
Our research site is well suited to study the realization of this relational re-
source dependence becausewe observe flows of resources—unilateral trans-
fers among organizations—over a long time period in a fine time grain. We
can observe, for example, that a large portion of organization i’s incoming
resource transfers come from organization j and interpret that i is more de-
pendent on j for resources. Organization i is free to choose recipients of its
outgoing transfers, but it cannot directly choose which other organizations
send resources to it.When organization i becomes dependent on j for a large
portion of its incoming resources, it may respond to this dependence by cul-858
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Interorganizational Exchangetivating this relationship further (giving back to j), or it may respond by seek-
ing alternative partners (giving to other organizations). This is an important
choice that we are in a position to address.
In the contexts we study, the perceived network is the structure of ongo-
ing unilateral transfers of resources among organizations. That is, organiza-
tions may conceive of their own dependence on others as the extent that
their various partners are currently sending resources to them.
Dependence reciprocation.—Actor i will give more to peer j if i depends
on j as a source of resources, that is, if i receives a greater proportion of
its incoming resources from j (relative to other partners).Retrospective Time Horizons
Embedding reciprocation and dependence reciprocation are both forms of
relational history dependence, but we expect that they will exhibit different
shapes over time. We model history dependence explicitly using shorter or
longer time horizons, meaning the scope of history that an actor remembers
and reckons in electing to reciprocate a transfer of resources. Our general ar-
gument is that embedding reciprocation at the organization levelmaybebuilt
and realized over a longer timehorizon,whereas dependence reciprocation is
a contemporaneous process, whose causes and consequences are realized in
the short term.
The behavioral foundations of embedding reciprocation appear in the
gradual “stickiness” of resource transfers, the development of routines and
habits among regular organizational partners, reinforced by communication
channels among administrative assistants, procurement officers, and other
personnel. The more one organization focuses its resource transfers on an-
other organization, the more it develops these dyadic organizational adhe-
sions, but these relational processes all take time to play out. Previous eth-
nographic work on organizations has informally discussed how reciprocity
develops into thicker and deeper embedding of organizations, including ex-
plicit assumptions about how this process transpires gradually over time.
“An arms-length tie tends to be recast into an embedded tie if a trial period
of reciprocal exchange results in voluntary contributions of new resources to
the relationship and in a concretizing of cooperative expectations. Over time
the iterative process progressively becomes independent of the initial eco-
nomic goals, resulting in an embedded tie” (Uzzi 1996, p. 679).
Much of this work has stressed interpersonal affective attachments that
develop among individual personnel through ongoing reciprocal exchange
at the organization level. However, the same effectmay be achieved by other
means. What we call “embedding” as interorganizational affinities or adhe-
sionsmay be composed not of personal friendships but of shared ormutually
understood operating routines, established communication channels (phone859
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Alland fax contact lists, e-mail distribution lists, etc.), familiarity among staff,
adaptivehabits, and similar coordinatingmechanisms.Theseprocesseshave
also been discussed extensively in the work on interorganizational networks
and organizational learning: “Firms deepen their ability to collaborate . . . by
instantiating and refining routines for synergistic partnering. [For] the devel-
opment of cooperative routines . . . firms must learn how to transfer knowl-
edge across alliances” (Powell et al. 1996, pp. 119–20).
Much of this work examines the performance consequences of alliances
and exchange, showing that organizations grow to work together better as
they collaborate over time. The same argument is used to understand why
organizations repeatedly choose particular peers as exchange partners. “As
[firms] continue to work together from project to project . . . both parties
can benefit from the somewhat idiosyncratic investment of learning to work
together” (Eccles 1981, p. 340). By not assuming that organization-level em-
bedding is necessarily due to interpersonal affective attachments, our theory
is robust to issues—such as multidivisional organization structure or per-
sonnel turnover—that would interfere with personal attachments as a basis
for organizational reciprocation.
Whereas the underlying logic of embedding reciprocation is about long-
term stickiness due to organizational embedding, the logic of dependence re-
ciprocation is about strategic choicebasedon resourcedependence: exchange
theory (Cook 1977) and resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik
1978) have universally regarded dependence as a property of a contempora-
neous opportunity structure, not a force that accumulates as a functionof his-
tory. “The dependence of one organization on another also derives from the
concentration of resource control . . .whether the focal organization has access
to the resource from additional sources” (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978, p. 50).
In this case, the present configuration of alternative partners (the per-
ceived opportunity structure) ismost relevant, and distant history plays little
role. In fact, works on dependence in the early formulations of exchange the-
ory (Emerson 1962; Blau 1964) and applications to interorganizational ex-
change (Cook 1977) have argued that dependence tends to actually decrease
over time within an organizational exchange relation through a variety of
“balancing mechanisms” (Cook 1977, p. 73), including changes in the net-
work or changes in the value of goods exchanged. That said, at anymoment,
dependence is algebraically determined by the exchange structure and val-
ues of goods, so it is not a function of time and does not require time passing
to be realized.
We have argued that our assumption that reciprocal exchange fostersmu-
tual organizational embedding only slowly and gradually over a long time
horizon reflects a universally held (if implicit) belief from previous research:
scholars have assumed that interorganizational embedding (by any name)
develops gradually throughexchangeover time.Wehave further shown that860
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Interorganizational Exchangescholars have assumed that structural power and dependence are properties
of a contemporaneous structure of exchange opportunities, not forces that
develop gradually over time.
Thus, our key arguments that embedding reciprocation plays out over a
longer time horizon and that dependence reciprocation reflects the contempo-
raneous structure of exchange represents an integration of two rich and long-
standing bodies of work. Our focus on temporal dynamics allows and in fact
requires us to develop these assumptions about time, which have other-
wise remained implicit in previous work. Our studying the interdependent
timing and sequence of interaction behavior allows us to develop this new
frontier.
It will be instructive to consider how embedding and dependence recipro-
cation will respond differently to a change in the exchange context, such as
the appearance of a new exchange partner. Following exchange theory (Em-
erson 1962; Blau 1964; Cook 1977) and resource dependence theory (Pfeffer
and Salancik 1978), dependence of organization i on a peer j emanates from
j’s unique importance as a source of resources and so updates promptlywith
i’s perception of the relative importance of alternative exchange partners
for incoming resources. Thus, if a new partner k appears and rapidly be-
comes an important source of resources for i, this diminishes i’s dependence
on j. However, any embedding built up between i and k over time—includ-
ing habits, routines, and relationships—responds slowly to repeated inter-
action over a much longer period and is not sensitive to short-term environ-
mental changes such as the appearance of an alternative partner.
Herewe operationalize the long-term time horizon as one year, andwe op-
erationalize the short-term time horizon as onemonth.Wewill describe how
these are plausible time horizons for the population that we study, but note
that the general theory is not wedded to this operationalization.Dynamics of Closure in Transfer of Resources among Organizations
Our theoretical focus is on reciprocation—distinguishing the dependence
and embedding perspectives on reciprocation and decomposing the time-
scales of those two processes. However, we can apply the same dynamic be-
havioral perspective to the pervasive phenomenon of closure at the level of
organizational triads. A deep analysis of subprocesses and temporal dynam-
ics of triad closure is beyond the scope of this article, but we must consider
basic triad-level patterns because they are entwined with dyad-level pat-
terns (Goodreau, Kitts, and Morris 2009; Wimmer and Lewis 2010; Block
2015). Because actors’ choices to reciprocate may depend on their mutual
embeddedness in exchange with other actors, failing to consider triads may
then lead us to misunderstand processes at the dyadic level.
We consider two basic triadic dynamics.861
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AllTransitive triad closure.—Actor i gives more to actor j, to the extent that
doing so contributes to a transitive pattern of exchange (i.e., to the extent
that i gives to k and k gives to j).
Cyclic triad closure.—Actor i gives more to actor j, to the extent that do-
ing so contributes to a cyclic pattern of exchange (i.e., to the extent that j
gives to k and k gives to i).
Transitive triad closure may occur through various mechanisms. For ex-
ample, the embedding processes that we described earlier may also apply at
the organizational triad level. Just as routines, habits, and personnel famil-
iarity may link organizations together, they also form the substrate for fos-
tering exchangewith third parties. An organizationmay refer one partner to
another directly, or organizations may encounter and build familiarity, rep-
utations, and trust through their shared embedded interaction with a third
party (Uzzi 1996; Keister 2001; McLean 2007), all leading to closure at the
triad level. Those triadic processes are analogous to what we have called
embedding reciprocation at the dyad level. However, transitive closure
may also reflect a very different mechanism: deference. If organization i sig-
nals deference to k by sending resources to k, and k similarly signals defer-
ence to j, then this may develop a status ordering of reputation that induces
organization i to defer to j (Gould 2002; Lynn et al. 2009). That is, local acts
of deference can crystallize into hierarchical population-level structures
that convey status and thus socially construct the perceived quality of or-
ganizations in that structure (Lynn et al. 2009; Martin 2011; Manzo and
Baldassarri 2014).
We have described two local micromechanisms leading to transitive triad
closure: embedded relations including referrals or other shared interaction
with third parties and also logics of hierarchy development through defer-
ence.Thosemechanismshave similar implications for transitive closure, but
they have opposite implications for cyclic closure. That is, extension of rela-
tions through third parties (e.g., organization i exchanges with organization
k and encounters k’s partner j through shared activities, observation, or di-
rect referral) can result in transitive closure (i sends to j) as well as cyclic clo-
sure ( j sends to i). This is not true for deference: extension of relations to third
parties through status behavior (e.g.,when organization idefers to organiza-
tion k, k defers to j ) results in transitive closure (i defers to j) but a negative
tendency toward cyclic closure ( j does not defer to i).
Extending our lens to the triad level gives us more purchase on the devel-
opment of population-level structure, as dyads combine into triads, which
then develop into larger structures of shared partners. A combination of pos-
itive reciprocity, positive transitive closure, and positive cyclic closure will
lead to clusters of generalized exchange at the population level. In fact, any
two of these processes is sufficient to produce generalized exchange (if the
third is at least neutral). By contrast, if dyads do not tend to reciprocate and862
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Interorganizational Exchangetransitive triad closure is positivebut cyclic closure is negative, then localpat-
terns of exchangewill aggregate into status hierarchies at the population level.
Our objective is not to develop a detailed theory of triadic dynamics, but
wenote thatboth transitive triadclosureandcyclic triadclosureplausiblyop-
erateonalongertimehorizon.Infact, forstructuralprocessesoperatingabove
the dyad level, their dynamics should operate at least as slowly (and would
require as least as much time to manifest) because they are constrained by
the confluence of multiple microlevel processes that also take time. For phe-
nomena such as the development of organizational clusters, or the develop-
ment of reputational status among organizations, the underlying processes
are notoriously sticky or inertial. We do not expect them to rapidly adjust to
changes or fluctuations in the exchange environment. Thus, as we consider
triad-level structural processes, we will focus our attention on the long-term
time horizon.RESEARCH DESIGN
Empirical Setting
To examine the proposed theory of resource transfers among organizations,
we study data collected on all patient transfer events observed between 2003
and 2007 within a community of 31 hospitals providing health care services
in Abruzzo, a region in southern Italy. Abruzzo extends over approximately
4,200 square miles, has a population of roughly 1,300,000 inhabitants, and
is partitioned into four provinces (Chieti, L’Aquila, Pescara, and Teramo),
which are further divided into 305 smaller municipalities. During the study
period, only 10%ofmunicipalities hadmore than 10,000 residents, 30%had
fewer than 1,000 residents, and the largest city of Pescara (the capital city)
had fewer than 120,000 residents.
The regional health system of Abruzzo is part of the Italian National
Health Service, which provides universal health assistance to all citizens
and residents free of charge at the point of service. The system is character-
ized by a federal structure organized at the regional level. Italian regional
health care systems are financed mainly from regions’ own revenues. Re-
gional governments are granted broad discretion in planning and organiz-
ing health care services in their own territory (Toth 2014). Within each re-
gion, responsibility for the delivery of services rests on local health units
(LHUs), which serve populations of roughly equal size. LHUs are well-
defined territorial and administrative units responsible for coordinating ser-
vices rendered by public as well as private accredited hospitals located in
their reference geographical area. Patients are free to seek health care from
any health care provider located within or outside their LHU of residence.
The regional health system in Abruzzo is partitioned into six LHUs. We
study all 10 private accredited hospitals and all 21 public hospitals (includ-863
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Alling two university teaching hospitals) that provide acute care services in the
region. Figure 1 displays the population of hospitals and their geographic
location. The figure also highlights hospital size, proximity to small urban
areas, and form of ownership (public or private).
Interhospital patient transfers are an integral component of the Italian
health care system and of health care institutions more generally (Sethi and
Subramanian 2014). Over recent decades the health care literature has de-
voted increasing attention to patient transfers by focusing not only on their
associated costs and clinical risks but also on the critical role they play in en-h
c
a
d
(3FIG. 1.—Map of Abruzzo hospitals, 2003–7. Public hospitals are light gray, private
ospitals are dark gray, and the six LHUs are indicated by bounded regions. Nodes
olocated in the same city are slightly separated for visual clarity, but hospitals 1, 7,
nd 31 are in L’Aquila (70,000 residents), 15, 18, and 19 are in Pescara (120,000 resi-
ents), 20, 27, and 28 are in Chieti (53,000 residents), and 3, 8, and 9 are in Avezzano
8,000 residents). All of these small cities are in separate LHUs.864
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Interorganizational Exchangesuring the best possible care to patients (Hains et al. 2011). While it is now
common to emphasize the economic aspects of hospitals as organizations
competing for patients on price and quality (Gaynor and Vogt 2003), hospi-
tals do differ frommost conventional business organizations in the extent to
which they operate in environments that are jointly technical and institu-
tional (Scott andMeyer 1991; Ruef,Mendel, and Scott 1998).Hospitalsmust
simultaneously optimize operational efficiency and follow elaborate institu-
tional regulations and norms in order tomaintain legitimacy. Their economic
performance and social legitimacy depend on their ability to contribute to the
health care system. Frequently, this involves collaboration with other hos-
pitals for the benefit of patients (Mascia and Di Vincenzo 2011; Lomi and
Pallotti 2012).
In Abruzzo, data on interhospital patient transfers are routinely collected
for policy purposes to assess the geographical structure of demand for health
care services and the institutional coordination requirements that demand
imposes on hospitals (Ugolini 2001). Reliable high-quality data on the timing
of patient transfer events are not publicly available but may be extracted
from individual clinical records. The data for this study were derived from
patient records provided by the Public Health Agency of Abruzzo, including
all patients hospitalized over the study period.A Network of Patient Transfer Events
Patient transfer is one of the most important forms of interhospital collab-
oration (Iwashyna et al. 2009; Iwashyna and Courey 2011; Lee et al. 2011;
Lomi and Pallotti 2012; Veinot et al. 2012; Mascia, Pallotti, and Angeli
2016; Stadtfeld et al. 2016) and typically occurs via direct interhospital pa-
tient transfers whereby patients discharged from one (“sender”) hospital are
admitted to another (“recipient”) hospital.Tobe sure, patient transfers are os-
tensibly intended to promote the patient’s health: a transfer occurs when a
hospital has patientswith complex pathologies forwhich it does not have ad-
equate diagnostic and therapeutic facilities or clinical competences, or pa-
tients with pathologies that may be treated more efficiently and effectively
elsewhere. In the case of nonemergency transfers that we examine in this ar-
ticle, the choice of the destination hospital involves an explicit partner selec-
tion decision: the choice to send a patient is due to the clinical needs of the
patient or limited capacity of the sender to meet those needs, but a sender
hospital may choose from any number of recipient hospitals for the same
patient, and this level of discretion for the sender invites the possibility that
sociologically interesting processes may be at play.
Onemight suspect that clinical expertise may be so localized at particular
hospitals that the demand for specific treatment capabilities and the distri-
bution of capabilities across hospitals generates an exogenous structure of865
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Alltransfers, with little discretion for senders. Although thismaybe true in some
contexts, in the case we study there is no major urban center, and these hos-
pitals are relatively small with similar generalist profiles. Patient transfers
are not generally driven by a need for specialist facilities. In fact, sensitivity
analyses elaborated in the appendix show that our findings are consistent
even if we fix the availability of specialties as an exogenous constraint and
model transfer choices above and beyond that structure. Finally, the re-
search literature on interhospital patient transfers (e.g., Bosk, Veinot, and
Iwashyna 2011; Iwashyna 2012) suggests that transferring is a deeply so-
cial process that does not just send patients to the nearest or highest quality
facilities.
Once the decision is made, completing a transfer requires not only a phys-
ical and technical infrastructure to make the transfer operationally possible
(Iwashyna 2012) but also a relational infrastructure based on a complex
coordination and information-sharing process between partner hospitals
(Bosk et al. 2011). The correct functioning of these infrastructures is essen-
tial for avoiding delays and maintaining continuity of medical care (Hains
et al. 2011).
In our analysis, we concentrate specifically and exclusively on transfers of
elective patients, also known as inpatients. Inpatients are individuals who
have already acquired the status of “admitted patient” and thus have con-
sented to follow the clinical and therapeutic paths proposed by professional
medical staff who are clinically responsible and legally liable for their con-
ditions. This is an important qualification because patient transfer events
are the outcome of organizational decisions overwhich patients have surren-
dered control upon admission. Of course, patients retain the right to refuse
transfer in the same way as they retain the right to refuse treatment. How-
ever, patients cannot choose where they will be transferred—a decision that
remains the exclusive prerogative of physicians in the sending hospital.
Our focus on patients qualified as “elective” intentionally excludes emer-
gency patients. This is an important distinction as emergency transfers are
governed by different mechanisms and are subject to different regulations
and operating procedures. In Abruzzo, as well as in other regions in Italy,
the transfer of patients between emergency rooms is often driven by over-
crowding, lack of available beds, staffing shortages, and lack of comprehen-
sive services. By contrast, for an elective patient a hospital bed has already
been assigned; hence, crowding is seldom a driving factor for either sending
or refusing an inpatient.
In terms of regulations and operating procedures, emergency transfers are
managed by a centralized system, called “rete 118” (118 network), that pro-
vides real time information on bed availability to facilitate rapid selection
of the nearest transfer targets that can accommodate emergency patients.866
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Interorganizational ExchangeFor inpatient transfer, however, a centralized superordinate system provid-
ing such information does not exist. As such, in this study we focus on a sys-
tem of interhospital collaborative relations where social processes of interor-
ganizational exchange are likely to be at work.
A distinctive feature of this study is its direct focus on patient transfer
event sequences, rather than simple network ties defined in terms of aggre-
gates of exchange events. However, for descriptive purposes (and compara-
bility with previous studies), we can conventionally aggregate the transfers
into a cross-sectional network, representing a flow of patients from hospital
i to hospital j as a tie in that network. Figure 2 displays these aggregated
exchange structures, arranging the nodes in the network tomake their struc-
ture of exchanges easily visible (see fig. 1 for geographic location). The dark-
ness of each tie indicates the intensity of the flow of patients within the study
period.
The aggregated patterns of transfers partly reflect exogenous constraints
that wemust control for in our analysis. For example, although transfers oc-
cur throughout the region, there does appear to be a bias toward transferring
to nearby hospitals and hospitals within the same LHU. Transfers also tend
to happen along the highway system and othermajor roads, so it is clear that
a simple control for geographic distance would be inadequate, and we must
also consider travel times (including road topography and traffic congestion)
just as the hospitals themselveswould consider these features. There are also
someapparent biases toward transferring to andamong large hospitals, pub-
lic hospitals, university hospitals, andurban hospitals. As these forces are ex-
ogenous influences on the structure of exchange, we will treat them as statis-
tical controls in the context of our models.The Inpatient Transfer Process
Transferring patients is an intensive and risky activity, and the transfer en-
tails transaction costs to both parties (Bosk et al. 2011). Inadequate coor-
dination between hospitals involved in patient transfers has predictable
adverse consequences (Lee et al. 2011). For these varied reasons patient
transfers produce signals of relational collaboration between hospitals
(Van de Ven and Walker 1984; Bolland and Wilson 1994; Iwashyna et al.
2009).
Applying our theory of reciprocation requires us to think about interhos-
pital patient transfer as a voluntary unilateral transfer of resources from
one party to another. Transferring a patient entails at least some cost to the
sender along with important substantive benefits to the recipient. In the
Italian health care system, the budget “follows” the patient. In other words,
patients are assigned cash values as a function of the care they receive. The867
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Interorganizational Exchangecorresponding resources are lost by the sender hospital and accrue to the
receiving hospital. Accordingly, receiving a patient is regarded as a direct
source of funding for the receiving hospital. This is what two physicians re-
ported to us in an interview (translated from Italian):All uPhysician A: Patients coming to us mean revenues for us. Also, the more we
are able to use our available capacity, the less we run the risk
that the region cuts the number of hospital beds at the end of
the year.
Physician B: The transfer of an elective patient always implies a loss for a
given hospital since, once we decide to transfer a patient, we of-
ten need to reschedule and internally reallocate important hos-
pital resources [e.g., surgical rooms] and staffed physicians’ and
nurses’ availability, which were initially planned. In addition,
we know that the regional authority is always attentive to cost-
containment initiatives and has the possibility to use available
admission [and transfer] data to eventually motivate decisions
regarding the reduction of budgetary resources.Just as patients represent funds that contribute to the bottom line for hos-
pitals and clinical wards, patients represent reputational goods for physi-
cians. Specifically, physicians signal their own expertise by reporting on
their CVs and web pages the number of cases they have treated or the num-
ber of surgeries they have performedwithin specific pathologies.Thus, send-
ing a patient entails a tangible opportunity cost in reputation, and receiving
a patient entails a tangible benefit. Receiving transfers also brings prestige
to the receiving hospital by the distinct quality-signaling value of transfers.
A doctor recounted, “The flow of transferred patients we receive from other
hospitalsmeans that our expertise is recognized at the regional level. The fact
thatmany hospitals transfer patients with complex cardiovascular problems
to us is a clear sign of our expertise, professionalism and our ability to treat
these types of patients.”
Receiving a patient gives an opportunity to acquire new competencies.
For example, the medical staff of the receiving hospital might learn from re-
ceiving a patient who underwent an innovative procedure or treatment pro-
tocol in the sending hospital. The director of a clinical ward in one of the
hospitals in our sample revealed that “transferring patients is an important
learning experience. Preparing the records that accompany the patient is an
extremely delicate and important activity. The doctors who complete and
sign the documents put a lot of effort into it. Sometimes they do it to impress
the receiving hospital. These documents often contain hundreds of pages—
containing information on referrals, diagnostic tests, and so on.” A physi-
cian added, “For the receiving hospital the advantage is that, if done in
an optimal way, the transfer increases the critical mass—that is, the number869
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Allof cases treated—and allows the acquisition of skills—the hospital learns
because often transfers concern complex and critical cases.”
Although we use analysis of a data set on patient transfers to examine our
hypotheses formally, our fieldwork provides considerable insight into the
underlyingsocialprocesses.Forexample,wehaveemphasized theroleofcol-
laboratingonpatient transfersasa sourceof familiarity andtrust among per-
sonnel in the hospitals, as well as a source of routines or scripts that facilitate
future association between the two hospitals (independently of the relations
of particular personnel). Thus, the more hospital A transfers to hospital B,
themore hospital Bwill be disposed to transfer to A by the same embedding
processes that sustain ongoing transfers fromA toB. Theward director also
said, “We know some hospitals better because we receive from them. And
it’s much easier to activate time-consuming transfer processes with hospi-
tals that we know better.”
Another doctor who oversawmany patient transfers interestingly reported,
“We need to carefully assess—and communicate—patients’ conditions and
everything has to be clear before the transfer is accepted and done. And this
does not depend solely on the severity of patients’ conditions; it actually de-
pends on hospitals’ mutual knowledge of resources, capabilities, as well as
clinical and administrative procedures. Previous patient transfer experience
enables the accumulation of such precious knowledge. But it needs to be ex-
changed and socialized among physicians before it can be integrated and be-
come part of the ‘memory’ of a hospital’s medical direction.”
We have described how the same processes of embeddedness that lead to
inertia—ongoing patterns of transfers that perpetuate further transfers in
the same direction—also lead to reciprocal transfers in the reverse direction.
A doctor speaks about the emergence of an informal organizational rela-
tionship between the surgical unit at one hospital and the rehabilitation unit
at a nearby hospital: “Once this relationship is activated and repeated over
time it becomes reciprocal. In other words, if the hospital providing rehabil-
itation services has patients who happen to need hospital care, this hospital
will tend to send these patients to the hospital from which it receives pa-
tients.”
Just as the mechanisms of organizational embeddedness work to channel
inertia and reciprocation, they may similarly lead to triad closure. In dis-
cussing this phenomenon, another physician explained that “if the doctor
in the contacted hospital cannot consent to receive the patient for whatever
reason, the contacted hospital typically recommends another hospital about
which they have information, such as the availability of that other hospital
to receive patients or the competence of that hospital to treat that patient.”
On the basis of our fieldwork and understanding, we expect that “cold”
processes of embeddedness (operating mostly through scripts, routines, op-
erating procedures, professional familiarity of clinical and administrative870
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Interorganizational Exchangestaff, ready access to information through frequent contact, etc.) underlie
much of what looks like relationships among these hospitals. That is, we do
not claim to observe deep affective bonds or normative obligations. How-
ever, we also saw evidence that some relevant decision makers may regard
patient transfers as a “favor” and may have some inclination to reciprocate
these favors. The medical director of one of the hospitals revealed to us that
“the choice of destination hospital is often made on the basis of familiarity
and mutual knowledge; that is, we give priority to hospitals that we know
better by virtue of the elevated number of patientswe receive from them.We
are aware of being considered a reference organization in our institutional
category by many hospitals and, in general, we tend to return the favor.”
Indeed, clinical patient referrals serve as a classic empirical example of
tacit reciprocity (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978, p. 149), and the possibility that
hospital staff could be motivated by an apparent norm of reciprocity is in-
triguing. We note, however, that any such “norm of reciprocity” is likely to
be much weaker than has been observed in other spheres such as gift giving
(e.g., Yang 1994; Bourdieu 1998; Park and Kim 2017) and is unlikely to be
acknowledged publicly. This is because the dominant professional norms
are for optimal patient care and secondarily for efficient use of hospital re-
sources, logics that seem incompatible with a political norm for reciprocal
exchange of favors among organizations. Our fieldwork revealed no perva-
sive general norm for reciprocity in this context, and we do not believe such
a force is driving the reciprocation we observe. Further, norms for patient
care are so dominant in this context that cultural practices that shape gift-
giving behavior—such as a norm against reciprocating too soon (Bourdieu
1998)—do not seem to apply.Time Horizons for Interhospital Reciprocation
Inpatient transfers across hospitals are recurrent, institutionalized, and
deeply social practices (Lee et al. 2011). Decisions to transfer patients are
usually discussed during meetings that occur periodically. Thus, hospitals’
attention to reciprocation issues in patterns of transfers over time may de-
velop over longer periods of time. Our short-term time horizon defines statis-
tics computed based on past patient transfers during the one month before
the event being currently modeled. We operationalize long-term time hori-
zons by computing statistics on all transfers over a time span of one year pre-
vious to the event being modeled. This implies that the time horizons are
nested (i.e., a sequence of events that happens within a month also happens
within a year) and that the monthly effects are marginal to the yearly effects
when included together in a model.
One year is a natural choice for the long-term time horizon, as it corre-
sponds to one organizational cycle of budgets, reviews, and performance as-871
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Allsessment. One month is not as obvious a choice for the short-term time ho-
rizon. A patient transfer could happen on any day, and some staff meetings
occur either weekly or monthly. Of course, the relevant scope would be the
period of time that staff who oversee transfer decisions would naturally con-
sider (implicitly) in evaluating a peer hospital as an exchange partner. Our
fieldwork suggests that one month is a long enough time to observe a part-
ner’s recent behavior as an input to a transfer decision.
The social processes of organizational reciprocation seem unlikely to op-
erate within a shorter time span of one to six days (as if organizations recip-
rocated on a weekly time horizon). The variability in transfers from one day
to the next is noisy; such fine-grained variability in transfer volume is either
random or is driven largely by exogenous forces (random shocks in medical
demand, attending physicians’ vacations, work schedules, state holidays,
etc.). Thus, the day-to-day records of transfers are hardly diagnostic for ac-
tors wishing to assess their environment and exchange partners, whereas the
monthlywindow reflects amore stable impression of the partner’s recent be-
havior. A reviewer raises the intriguing question of fine-grained reciproca-
tion, such as tit-for-tat exchanges of patients by hospitals (Axelrod 1984).
We see no evidence of such fine-grained reciprocation in the immediate dy-
namics of patient transfers, in either our fieldwork or statistical analyses.
Our implementation of reciprocation is an extension of Kollock’s (1993) “re-
laxed accounting strategies,” which respond to general patterns over time
periods rather than mimicking a partner’s most recent move.Data
We examine the complete set of patient transfers observed between all 930
directed pairs of hospitals. The resulting data set features a total of 4,111 pa-
tient transfer events among the 31 hospitals over a period of five years from
January 2003 until December 2007. On average, 2.26 patients were trans-
ferred each day (SD 5 1.71) with 276 days in which there was no transfer
and a maximum of 10 transfers on a single day. As figure 3 shows, the dis-
tribution of transfers is relatively stable over time, with predictable varia-
tions in daily transfer levels due to weekends or holidays, when fewer trans-
fers of admitted elective inpatients typically occur.
The overall average number of patients sent per hospital in the data set is
132.61 (SD5 189.56) with amedian of 76, aminimum of 1, and amaximum
of 1,015 patients sent. The average number of patients received per hospital
is 132.61 (SD 5 258.80) with a median of 38, a minimum of 0, and a maxi-
mum of 1,056 patients received. Themaximumvalue reflects a single outlier
sender-receiver pair that is anomalous in volume and character (i.e., the re-
ceivinghospital is known tohave conveyed cashbribes to entice the sender to
transfer patients); we discuss this case later and control for this anomalous872
This content downloaded from 144.173.023.038 on March 15, 2019 03:26:37 AM
 use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
All use suF
IG
.3
.—
N
u
m
b
er
of
d
ai
ly
p
at
ie
n
t
tr
an
sf
er
s
b
et
w
ee
n
20
03
an
d
20
07
(w
it
h
m
on
th
ly
m
ov
in
g
av
er
ag
e)
.This content downloaded from 144.173.023.038 on March 15, 201
bject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.9 0
jou3:
rn26:37 AM
als.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
American Journal of Sociology
Allflow in statisticalmodels.Most transfers (76%)are fromone clinical specialty
at the sending hospital to a different clinical specialty at the recipient. The
median waiting time before a transfer is reciprocated is 34 days; the median
waiting time before transitive triad closure is 68 days; the median waiting
time before cyclic triad closure is 117 days.Hypotheses
We have described a general theory of the dynamics of interorganizational
exchange behavior, using insights drawn from theories of social exchange,
resource dependence, and embeddedness. We now apply this theory by de-
riving and testing empirical hypotheses about the dynamics of patient trans-
fers over the population of hospitals in Abruzzo, Italy, in 2003–7. In our em-
pirical case, hospital i’s choice to reciprocate to hospital j depends on the
history of giving among hospitals i and j, as well aswith all shared exchange
partners k.
Following from our argument about how interorganizational exchange
events become embedded over a longer time horizon, we offer two hypoth-
eses about patterns of inertia in patient transfers:
HYPOTHESIS 1a.—To the extent that hospital i has focused its patient
transfers on another hospital j in the past, hospital i will be more likely to
transfer patients to j in the future (embedding inertia).
HYPOTHESIS 1b.—Embedding inertia will operate primarily in the long
term (considering the past year) rather than in the short term (considering
the past month).
Building on the same mechanism of growing organizational embedded-
ness, we offer two corresponding hypotheses about embedding reciprocation:
HYPOTHESIS 2a.—To the extent that hospital j has focused its patient
transfers on hospital i in the past, hospital i will be more likely to transfer
patients to j in the future (embedding reciprocation).
HYPOTHESIS 2b.—Embedding reciprocation will operate primarily in the
long term (considering the past year) rather than in the short term (consid-
ering the past month).
Some readers may wonder whether information about j’s other outgoing
transfers is available to i in deciding whether to reciprocate to j. In fact,
deidentified information about all transfers is available within the Italian
hospital system, although there is no guarantee that physicians or other per-
sonnel involved in administering transfers will pay attention to this infor-
mation. It is plausible that they are aware of coarse patterns of patient trans-
fers among peer hospitals over a long time horizon, but it seems unlikely
that they monitor the individual transfers or fine-grained patterns. Indeed,
our fieldwork revealed little evidence that transfer agents kept close tabs on874
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Interorganizational Exchangethe outgoing transfer volume of their partners to decide how toweigh incom-
ing transfers from those neighbors. Note that our theory does not require
i to observe j’s outgoing transfers. Our proposed embedding mechanism is
not an emotional drive or normative obligation to reciprocate due to rec-
ognizing j’s visible generosity in giving. It is a by-product of interorganiza-
tional routines, habits, personnel familiarity, and other organizational em-
bedding that make i–j exchange (in both directions) easier, less costly, and
less risky or uncertain. The proposed embedding inertia and embedding re-
ciprocation mechanisms work in a reciprocal way, in which each organiza-
tion’s focus on the other partner gradually leads to the operational special-
ization that supports and reinforces ongoing exchange.
Whereas embedding inertia and embedding reciprocation represent a
gradual buildup of relation-specific resources that enhance the quality or ef-
ficiency of exchange, dependence reciprocation represents investing in ex-
change partners that are important solutions to immediate resource needs,
and thus it operates on the contemporary structure of exchange.
HYPOTHESIS 3a.—Hospital i will respond to its own dependence on ex-
change partners: it will reciprocate to hospitals j that are important sources
of patients to i (dependence reciprocation).
This hypothesis follows directly from the standard argument in exchange
theory that organization iwill transfer resources to organization j as a direct
function of i’s dependence on j. In this work, resource transfers are called
“balancing mechanisms” because they tend to increase dependence of j on
i and thus balance dependence in the dyad (Cook 1977, p. 73). Following ex-
change theory, this force of dependence attends to the current balance of ex-
change, not long-term history.
HYPOTHESIS 3b.—Dependence reciprocation will operate primarily in the
short term (considering the past month) rather than in the long term (con-
sidering the past year).
This dependencemechanism does not require physicians or other person-
nel involved in administering transfers at hospital i to have information
about j’s outgoing transfers, but it does require information about recent
incoming transfers from other hospitals—which is readily available.
To recapitulate, we expect that the temporal scope for resource depen-
dence applies to the current exchange structure (the most recent exchange
patterns), whereas the temporal scope for organizational embedding applies
to a longer history of exchange. Although our theoretical focus is on recip-
rocation, we recognize that we must also model triadic patterns of transfers
because reciprocation is embedded in exchangewith other hospitals.We ex-
pect to see transitive triad closure. We recognize that cyclic triad closure
could be positive (yielding generalized exchange) or negative (yielding sta-
tus hierarchy), but at this point we have no strong a priori expectation of875
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Alleither effect for the entire population of patient transfers, so we do not offer
a triad-level hypothesis here.METHOD
Using Retrospective Time Horizons to Weigh the History
of Structure or the Structure of History
Extant research provides little guidance about the temporal patterns by
which organizations weigh past relational events (such as giving by peers)
inmaking their own decisions. This is because issues of timing in interaction
sequences are rarely considered explicitly. In order tomake the clearest con-
trast between the attention to the present-day structure of giving and atten-
tion to patterns over more distant history, we define the former as the set of
events in the past month and the latter as the set of events in the past year.
This is effectively a piecewise specification of time dependence: events older
than the time horizon threshold (one month for short term and one year for
long term) are not taken into consideration for present-day transfer choices.
We show that our qualitative conclusions are not sensitive to the exact thresh-
old by replicating the analysis with adjusted thresholds (using a quarter in-
stead of a year as the long-term horizon and using aweek instead of amonth
as a short-term horizon). Results are qualitatively similar for both of those
analyses, althoughwe observe that endogenous structural processes are pre-
dictably weaker in analyses based on a one-week time horizon.
Nor are our results sensitive to our using a strict threshold instead of
smoother decay of importance between the present day (i.e., recent history)
and distant history.We show this robustness by replacing the simple thresh-
olds with continuous decay functions, so our short term is a rapid decay in
weight over time, and long term is a slow decay. For this purpose, we drew a
negated translated sigmoidmemory decay function from research on sparse
distributed memory (Ramamurthy, D’Mello, and Franklin 2006): f ðxÞ 5
1 2 ½1=ð1 1 e2aðx2cÞÞ with a 5 1. This model assumes a monotonic decay
of importance of past events but includes parameters that can be tuned to
allow history dependence to decay toward zero around a designated time
horizon (c 5 30 days for short term and c 5 365 days for long term). This
alternative specification replaces the strict time horizon threshold with a
smooth curve but retains the qualitative distinction between immediate his-
tory and long-term history. Thus, our results do not depend on the exact
boundaries of time horizons on the operationalization of time horizons as
discrete boundaries but represent a more general contrast of the present-
day relational environment and the long-term historical relational environ-
ment. In this article we present the simpler piecewise specification of time
horizons for brevity and clarity.876
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Interorganizational ExchangeRelational Event Model
As researchers shift focus from static patterns to dynamics of networks, some
have applied event history analysis tools to investigate the appearance
(Rosenkopf and Padula 2008) or dissolution (Levinthal and Fichman 1988)
of interorganizational ties. Stochastic actor-oriented models (Snijders 2001)
provide another promising lens, where researchers take repeated cross-
sectional observations of networks and model the (unobserved) appearance
and disappearance of ties during the time intervals between those observed
networks. However, directly examining the interaction behavior among
organizations offers unprecedented leverage for dynamic analysis, building
on earlier static approaches to structural events (Ruef 2002). Instead of con-
ceptualizing change in a network from one year to the next, we directly study
the strength or rates of exchange behavior among organizations over time.
Our research reported in this article applies a new class of models to investi-
gate the sequence of exchange events connecting organizations. We know of
no other study that has analyzed the temporal dynamics of interorganiza-
tional exchange, as this theoretical step is enabled by new analytical lenses.
Themodel presented here is based on the sequential formofButts’s (2008)
relational event framework. This framework is suited tomodel sequences of
relational events, which in this case represent social acts by individual par-
ties directed at other individual parties (p. 159). Each event is assumed to be
independent of all other events but conditional on the sequence of events
that have occurred in the past. This assumption of conditional independence
of events implies that “past history creates the context for present (inter)ac-
tion, forming differential propensities for relational events to occur” (p. 160).
The framework enables the estimation of the likelihood of particular pat-
terns of past relational event sequences to be associated with a future rela-
tional event, without assuming that a future event is completely determined
by these patterns.
While the general form of a relational event model is a continuous-time
event history model, the ordinal version of the model we use can be repre-
sented as a familiar conditional logistic regression (Butts 2008). Indeed, we
focus on the sequence of events and not on the precise time at which events
occur. Each new event defines a stratum, and the possible events within the
stratum are the set of possible pairs who may be linked as sender and recip-
ient of the next event. The probability of each possible event within the stra-
tum is conditional on the relational statistics computed from the prior se-
quence of events, and there are m(m 2 1) possible next events if m actors
are potential participants in the next event. As the parameterization of the
model is specific to relational exchanges, the model predicts the realization
of the next event in the sequence on the basis of individual attributes of the877
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Allsenderandrecipient, attributes of thedyad, and thepriorhistoryof relational
events. This prior history is composed of configurations of actors linked by
events. These configurations are counted across a time horizon to explore
the tendency of future events to be triggered by past events. We model such
history dependence over longer time horizons (counts of events over the past
year) and shorter time horizons (counts of events over the past month).
The statistics are inspired by exponential random graph model statistics
(Goodreau et al. 2009; Harris 2014), and functional forms generally follow
Butts (2008). Statistics are scaled across all values for observed and poten-
tial events, based on calculating a proportion of previous events rather than
a raw count. For instance, the statistic for embedding inertia is the propor-
tion of previous patient transfers from the sender to the recipient out of the
count of patients transferred by the sender, rather than the count of past
transfers from the sender to the recipient. It can be interpreted as the extent
that hospital i focuses its outgoing patient transfers on hospital j.
While parameterization of the model draws from network analysis, the
use of event sequences avoids some problems associated with traditional
methods of network analysis. First, we do not need to aggregate all patient
transfers into one or more cross-sections or make event streams into binary
ties so we do not lose information on the sequence of the underlying events.
Second, because we retain the sequencing of the events we can avoid the
standard problem of nonindependence of observations that affects network
analysis and model the probability of one event happening conditional on
covariates that include prior states of the system. As Butts (2008, p. 192) ex-
presses, “The ability to impose sequential dependence on all events, in par-
ticular, avoids the more complex, simultaneous structures of dependence
that emerge from realistic models with concurrent relationships” and that
often require special statistical techniques, such as exponential family ran-
dom graph models with Markov chain Monte Carlo estimation (Goodreau
et al. 2009; Wimmer and Lewis 2010).
The approach has similarities with sequence analysis (Abbott 1995). We
model a specific type of event sequence, where a single behavior recurs in a
sequence acrossmany dyads in a population. Yet, our covariates differ from
a typical sequence analysis because they capture configurations of actors
that are linked by events, rather than a pattern of events that occurred dur-
ing the lives or careers of actors. The aim of a relational event model is to fit
a limited number of parameters in order to derive a parsimonious explana-
tion of patterns in thewhole sequence of events, rather than finding a limited
number of clusters that identify prototypical patterns of event sequences, as
ismore common in sequence analysis (Abbott andHrycak 1990; Stovel, Sav-
age, and Bearman 1996). We focus on structural dependence (across actors),
whereas most sequence analysis work has assumed independence of actors878
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Interorganizational Exchangeand focused in richer detail on the temporal sequencing of independent
chains of events (Abbott 2001). Stark andVedres (2006) andBothner, Smith,
and White (2010) also applied sequence analysis within social networks re-
search, but these were more similar to conventional network analysis (in fo-
cusing on a set of cross-sectional snapshots of network ties) and closer to con-
ventional sequence analysis (in studying characteristic sequences of network
positions, held by actors). By contrast, we are examining the sequence of be-
havioral interaction events as they enact structural forces andmutually con-
stitute the observed network.
Finally, we differentiate our approach from the rich study of dyadic and
triadic exchange patterns in conversation analysis, such as the work on turn
takingbyGibson (2012).A set of strong rules applies to conversations, in that
parties must take turns speaking, avoid silence, and respond directly to the
immediately preceding talk, and the sequence of exchanges must compose
a coherent and intelligible narrative for which the sequence is essential for
the conversationmeaning.Again, the dependencies in the exchange patterns
we observe do not take the form of direct sequential reciprocation, there is
no need for turn taking and no avoidance of silence, and any exchange pat-
terns emerge implicitly over time. A patient is transferred at a particular
time because the patient needs to be transferred, not because the hospital
needs to reply to another hospital or maintain a conversation. Above all, re-
call that we are not studying the timing of transfer choices (which reflects
the needs of the patient), but instead we are studying the development of re-
lational transfer patterns over time. Further details about the estimation of
the relational event model and the preparation of the data set are available
in the appendix.Variables and Controls
Dependent variable.—Wemodel the transfer of a patient from hospital i to
hospital j. More specifically, given features of hospitals and their environ-
ments, and a historical sequence of transfer events, the dependent variable
is the next event in the sequence. For each patient transfer event, the depen-
dent variable is a binary variable containing the set of possible patient trans-
fer arcs (ordered pairs of hospitals) and takes the value 1 if the event actually
occurred between the hospitals in the arc and the value 0 if it did not occur.
Independent variables.—Our independent variables capture the history
of patient transfers between j and i, as well as the history of their exchanges
with all other neighbors k. To represent embedding inertia for hospital i,
we compute the proportion of patients sent by hospital i to hospital j out of
all the patients sent by hospital i. A positive (negative) parameter estimate
indicates that the higher the proportion of patients that i sent to j in the his-879
This content downloaded from 144.173.023.038 on March 15, 2019 03:26:37 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
American Journal of Sociology
Alltorical time horizon, the higher (lower) the probability that iwill send a pa-
tient to j now. To represent embedding reciprocation, we compute the pro-
portion of patients sent by hospital j to hospital i out of all the patients sent
by hospital j. For dependence reciprocation, we compute the proportion of
patients sent by hospital j to hospital i out of all the patients received by hos-
pital i. Transitive closure represents the tendency for hospital i to give to
hospital j as a function of the extent that doing so will constitute a transitive
triadic pattern of giving (i.e., to the extent that i gives to k and k gives to j).2
We compute this as the number of two-paths that occur when patients are
sent by hospital i to hospital(s) k and patients are also sent by the same hos-
pital(s) k to j. Following Butts (2008), we assume that a two-path is no stron-
ger than its weakest link (the lesser of the number of patients transferred
from i to k or from k to j).Cyclic closure represents the tendency for hospital
i to give to hospital j as a function of the extent that doing sowill constitute a
cyclic pattern of giving (i.e., to the extent that j gives to k and k gives to i).
We compute the weight of two-paths that occur when patients are sent by j
to hospital(s) k and patients are also sent by hospital(s) k to i, again assuming
that a two-path is no stronger than its weakest link (the lesser of the number
of patients transferred from j to k or from k to i). A definition of each of the
statistics is given in figure 4. All statistics are standardized to facilitate com-
parison across parameters.
Three categories of control covariates are incorporated into the models
that we estimate: individual organizational controls, dyadic organizational
controls, and endogenous structural controls.
Individual organizational controls.—We control for a number of
organization-specific attributes that may provide alternative explanations
for the tendencyofhospital organizations to sendor receivepatients.Wemight
suspect, for example, that larger hospitals have a higher activity level in the
transfer community simply because they treat more patients or that hospi-
tals aremore attractive as recipients if they have low occupancy (less crowd-
ing) or better efficiency.We thus include total number of staffed beds (size) to
control for the higher activity level of larger hospitals and the average per-
centage of beds occupied (occupancy rate) to control for interhospital dif-
ferences in capacity management and availability. To control for the pos-
sibility that more efficient hospitals are preferred recipients, we use the
standard comparative performance index (CPI) as a measure of operationalNote that the patients sent by i to k are typically not the same patients as those sent by k
j. Thus, we are talking about triadic patterns of transfer decisions for hospitals, not
equences of admissions for individual patients.2
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Allinefficiency.3 Because daily measures are not available, when organization-
specific attributes change over time, their measure is taken yearly. This pe-
riodization is broadly consistent with the yearly budget and performance
evaluation cycle that regulates change in resource stocks available to hospi-
tals. Resources available to hospitals like, for example, staffed hospital beds
change across years as a function of changes in the regional budget and in
the performance of the hospital but are more or less constant within years.
Given that public and private hospitals may differ in their tendencies to
send and receive patients, and urban or rural hospitals may also differ, we
include public and urban controls for both sender and receiver. Some trans-
fers may target a clinical specialty unit (e.g., cardiology) that is not offered
in the sending hospital. We include a binary variable in-house capability to
indicate that the sender has a named specialty unit to treat in the area tar-
geted by the transfer. Finally, given the special role of university teaching
hospitals in providing health care, we include a dummy variable to control
for their activity as senders or popularity as receivers.
Dyadic organizational controls.—Having controlled for the above fea-
tures of senders and receivers, we also need to control for features of partic-
ular dyads that may affect the likelihood of transfers. For example, we ex-
pect that patients will be transferredmore frequently between hospitals that
are closer in geographic space (Sorenson and Stuart 2001). We thus control
for distance between each hospital to account for the joint effect of transpor-
tation costs and clinical risks inherent in distant patient transfers. We mea-
sure distance in driving minutes, rather than geographic distance, in order
to capture the various constraints (topography, driving routes, and traffic
congestion) that hospitals must consider in making transfer decisions. Or
it could be that patients tend to be transferredmore frequently between hos-
pitals offering complementary services, because in this way hospitals may
be able to exploit economies of scale deriving from interorganizational divi-
sion of labor. To control for the effect of dependence on common resources
for which hospitals compete (i.e., patients), we include the variable nicheTheCPImeasures a hospital’s efficiency—in terms of length of stay—relative to the av-
rage efficiency of a reference set of hospitals with an analogous composition of cases
eated, where cases are categorized into diagnosis related groups (DRGs). CPI is com-
uted as CPIj 5 onci51½di  Ni=oni51½Di  Ni, where di indicates the average length of
tay of DRGi numbered in hospital j, Di indicates the average length of stay of DRGi
umbered in the reference set of hospitals with an analogous composition of cases treated,
i indicates the number of discharges of DRGi numbered in the reference set of hospitals,
indicates the number ofDRGs in the reference set of hospitals, andnc indicates the num-
er of common DRGs overlapping between hospital j and the reference set of hospitals
ianino et al. 2006). The CPI takes the value 1.0 for hospitals whose service efficiency is
n parwith all other hospitals in the region.TheCPI takes values that are smaller (greater)
an 1.0 for hospitals that are less (more) inefficient than comparable peer hospitals.3
e
tr
p
s
n
N
n
b
(G
o
th882
This content downloaded from 144.173.023.038 on March 15, 2019 03:26:37 AM
 use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Interorganizational Exchangeoverlap, as conceptualized by Podolny, Stuart, and Hannan (1996) and as
adapted by Sohn (2002) specifically for representing competitive interde-
pendence in a hospital dyad.4 We also control for service differentiation in
a dyad by reconstructing a two-modematrix of hospitals by the clinical spe-
cialties they provide. We then computed the Euclidean distances between
hospitals in the space spanned by all the clinical specialties. Geographic
and administrative reasons may make patient transfers more likely within
rather than between LHUs. We thus control for same LHU in our models.
In addition to sender and receiver effects for urban and public, we use an
indicator for shared urban and public status (both urban, both public) to al-
low for the possibility of homophily or heterophily on these features.
Finally, we also compute dyadic differences on a number of the
organization-level controls (size difference, occupancy difference, ineffi-
ciency difference) to allow that hospitals may transfer patients to larger, less
crowded, and better performing hospitals, compared to themselves. It seems
intuitive to include model terms for sender size, recipient size, and size dif-
ference, but this implies a linear dependence, as the difference is obviously
determined by the other two terms. We could instead omit difference terms
to include both sender and receiver size (both would be significant and pos-
itive, as larger hospitals send and receivemore patients) but present themost
intuitive parameterization here. How we deal with this parameterization of
the controls has no effect on other results.
Our last concern is an exogenous interference in the normal exchange dy-
namics in the form of bribery of one hospital by another hospital (which re-
sulted in prosecution and conviction shortly after our study period). This
bribery led to an anomalously high transfer rate from the bribed hospital
to the bribing hospital. We include a binary variable to control for this one
arc—bribery—which reflects a different process from the dynamics of recip-
rocation in patient exchange. To be sure, bribery is an interesting topic, and
it obviously affects patient exchange in this case. However, of 930 directed
ties observed in this study, there was only one observed corrupt tie, and thus4 Niche overlap among hospitals is measured as follows. Patient discharges are first strat-
ified into 25 major service diagnostic categories and aggregated to the zip code level to
construct one patient origin-destination matrix for each service category. In the Abruzzo
region there are 305 zip code areas. For each service category, niche overlap is computed
as xij5∑ kwikmin(pik, pjk) /∑ kwikpik, where min(pik, pjk) indicates the overlap (or “inter-
section”) in patient pools between hospital i and hospital j in zip code k, and the weight
wik indicates the proportion of all patients admitted to hospital iwho come from zip code
k. In the equation above, the numerator expresses the overall sum of niche overlaps be-
tween hospital i and j across all zip code areas, while the denominator simply tells the
niche width of the ith hospital, i.e., the total number of patients admitted by hospital i
across all zip code areas. The (dyadic) niche overlap coefficient,xijmay then be interpreted
as the proportion of the patient pool of a hospital overlapped by another hospital. The term
min(pik, pjk) requires that xij lies between 0 (no overlap) and 1 (maximum overlap).
883
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Allwe do not have sufficient data to study the emergence of corrupt exchange
(of cash given for patients received) as a distinct process. This one tie was
both independently confirmed in its criminal activity and also anomalous
in its volume and pattern of exchange, so after extensive study and sensitiv-
ity analysis we confirmed that the most appropriate way to deal with this
one directed tie was to control for the anomalous flow.
Table 1 reports definitions, measures, and descriptive statistics of all the
organization-specific covariates that are control factors in the models that
we estimate in the next section. We note that for variables whose values
change over time (all but geographic distance, LHUmembership, and insti-
tutional type) descriptive statistics are given in this table as average values
over the five years, but the longitudinal data are used in the analyses.
Endogenous structural controls.—Wehave controlled for features of hos-
pitals and hospital dyads that seem to exert force on the transfer process. In
order to control for otherwise unobserved heterogeneity in the tendency for
hospitals to send or receive patients, we also include degree-based effects.
Specifically, we control for historical activity (overall tendency to send pa-
tients) and popularity (overall tendency to receive patients) for both sender
and recipient over the short term and long term, as they may affect their
likelihood to send or receive another patient. Definitions of these statistics
are given in figure 5.
There are surely correlations among the variables of theoretical interest
and controls, but multicollinearity diagnostics do not raise concerns. The
maximum correlation of our variables of theoretical interest with each other
or with our control variables is 0.626, and all variance inflation factor coef-
ficients for our variables of theoretical interest are below 2.5 in all models
reported. There is some multicollinearity among some of the controls (e.g.,
size sender and size difference), but this does not affect our results.
The base model includes control variables and should be considered as a
null model against which subsequentmodels can be compared. Goodness of
fit is reported as deviance, or22 times the log of the ratio of likelihoods for
the estimated model to a saturated model. Decreases in deviance for nested
models can be compared to a chi-squared distribution with degrees of free-
dom equal to the number of additional parameters. Note that all models re-
ported represent a significant reduction deviance compared to the model in-
cluding only controls.RESULTS
Maximum likelihood estimates for three models are presented in table 2.
Model 1 is the base with only control variables. Model 2 introduces endog-
enous structural variables of theoretical interest transitive closure and cyclic
closure in the long term, alongwith the embedding inertia and sender-scaled884
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TABLE 2
Parameter Estimates of Relational Event Models for
All Transfers between 2003 and 2007
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Variable of theoretical interest:
Long term:
Embedding inertia . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33** (.02) .32** (.02)
Embedding reciprocation . . . . . . . . .17** (.02)
Dependence reciprocation. . . . . . . . 2.02 (.01)
Transitive closure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24** (.01) .23** (.01)
Cyclic closure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13** (.02) .05* (.02)
Short term . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Embedding inertia . . . . . . . . . . . . . .03** (.01) .04** (.01)
Embedding reciprocation . . . . . . . . .02* (.01)
Dependence reciprocation. . . . . . . . .02* (.01)
Organizational control:
Size sender. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.45** (.09) 1.40** (.10) 1.25** (.10)
Size difference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.92** (.10) 2.74** (.10) 2.57** (.10)
Occupancy recipient . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.30** (.07) .05 (.07) 2.03 (.07)
Occupancy difference . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.01 (.07) .15* (.07) .11 (.07)
Inefficiency recipient. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.03 (.04) 2.04 (.04) 2.02 (.04)
Inefficiency difference. . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.14** (.04) 2.12** (.04) 2.09* (.04)
Geographic distance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.51** (.04) 2.36** (.05) 2.44** (.04)
Niche overlap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26** (.02) .11** (.02) .08** (.02)
Service differentiation. . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.13** (.03) 2.17** (.03) 2.09** (.03)
Same LHU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.82** (.05) 1.03** (.07) 1.31** (.07)
Both urban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25** (.06) .30** (.06) .31** (.06)
Sender urban. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22.29** (.17) 22.11** (.18) 22.22** (.18)
Recipient urban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.48* (.19) 2.28 (.19) 2.17 (.19)
Both public . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.82** (.42) 1.18** (.42) 1.24** (.42)
Sender public . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.79 (.42) 2.50 (.42) 2.78 (.42)
Recipient public . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49 (.41) .53 (.41) .87* (.41)
In-house capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.33** (.3) 2.37** (.03) 2.35** (.03)
Bribery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.56** (.20) 2.71** (.21) 2.87** (.22)
Sender teaching. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.18 (.19) .29 (.18) .54** (.18)
Recipient teaching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .74** (.13) .54** (.13) .48** (.13)
Endogenous structural control:
Long term:
Popularity sender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27** (.05) 2.05 (.06) .13* (.06)
Activity sender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10* (.04) 2.02 (.04) .01 (.04)
Popularity recipient. . . . . . . . . . . . . .37** (.04) .01 (.05) .08 (.05)
Activity recipient. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .00 (.03) 2.08* (.03) 2.10** (.04)
Short term:
Popularity sender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .05 (.04) 2.01 (.04) .04 (.04)
Activity sender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12** (.03) .09** (.03) .10** (.03)
Popularity recipient. . . . . . . . . . . . . .09** (.03) .05 (.03) .06* (.03)
Activity recipient. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .01 (.03) 2.00 (.03) 2.00 (.03)
Goodness of fit:
Null deviance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44,388
Residual deviance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28,014 27,231 27,354
Observed events (potential events). . . 3,247 (3,016,463)This content downloaded from
All use subject to University of Chicago Press887
 144.173.023.038 o
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American Journal of Sociology
Allembedding reciprocation in both the short term and long term.Model 3 uses
the alternative receiver-scaled weighting (dependence reciprocation).
Parameter estimates in model 1 indicate that larger hospitals tend to send
more patients (positive size sender), and also patients are more likely to be
transferredwhen the receiving hospital is larger than the sender (negative size
difference). Hospitals with higher occupancy (more stringent capacity con-
straints) are generally less likely to receive patients, but dyadic differences
in occupancy rates do not appear to be important. We take this as evidence
that patient transfer does not follow a straightforward logic of capacity man-
agement. We find no evidence that inefficiency of the recipient has an inde-
pendent effect, and patients are slightly more likely to be transferred from
more efficient hospitals to less efficient hospitals (negative inefficiency dif-
ference).5 Estimates suggest that a hospital is more likely to transfer patients
to a more proximate hospital (negative distance effect). The estimates also
indicate that niche overlap has a positive effect: patient transfers are more
likely between hospitals with overlapping patient pools. The effect of ser-
vice differentiation is significantly negative: patient transfers are less likely
between hospitals offering different types of services. Also, patient transfers
are more likely between organizations facing the same administrative con-
straints, opportunities, and institutional partners (because they are members
of the same LHU). Urban hospitals tend to send to each other (positive both
urban) and generally send less (negative sender urban) than nonurban hos-
pitals. The apparent tendency for public hospitals to receive more patients
in general seems to be captured by other control variables, especially a ten-
dency for public hospitals to send to each other (positive both public) and for
teaching hospitals to receive patients (positive recipient teaching). Consis-
tent with intuition, hospitals are less likely to send patients if they have the
specialty that the patient requires for her treatment (negative in-house ca-
pability). Finally, we control for the high volume of transfers in the one di-
rected tie that was investigated and convicted of corruption for the period
we study (bribery).
As for the structural controls, see that historically popular hospitals
(which have received more patients over the historical time horizon) in the
long-term past are more likely to both send and receive patients, althoughWe control for inefficiency to avoid spurious effects that could be due to unmeasured
eterogeneity. The observed pattern suggests that more efficient (low-CPI) hospitals
re more likely to transfer patients. However, their choice of recipient hospital is clearly
ot driven by differences in efficiency of the receiving hospital (they are not sending to
ore efficient hospitals or even to particularly efficient hospitals), and this leaves open
e possibility that sociologically interesting processes (such as reciprocation) may be
t play.5
h
a
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a888
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Interorganizational Exchangethis pattern is not as robust in the short term. Historically active hospitals
(which have sentmany patients over the time horizon) aremore likely to send
patients but not to receive them.
Model 1 controls for a large number of important features of senders and
receivers (urban,public, size, occupancyrate, inefficiency, capability, research/
teaching hospital) and of hospital pairs (geographic distance, niche overlap,
service differentiation, LHUmembership, differences on organization-level
attributes), as well as popularity and activity controls that likely capture re-
maining unobserved heterogeneity at the sender and receiver level.Models 2
and 3 in table 2 allow us to focus on the results of theoretical interest. In both
models, we do see evidence of reciprocation for hospitals (i.e., hospitals tend
to give back patients to other hospitals that give to them). This is true for
both embedding and dependence reciprocation, but we also see preliminary
evidence that timescale matters; that is, distinct social processes depend dif-
ferently on history. Model 2 includes embedding inertia (the tendency for i’s
historical focus on giving to j to be reproduced in future transfers from i to
j) and embedding reciprocation (the tendency for j’s historical focus on giv-
ing to i to lead i to give to j). Both effects are significant and positive (sup-
porting hypotheses 1a and 2a), and both are more strongly positive in the
long term than in the short term (supporting hypotheses 1b and 2b).
Model 3 shows a positive effect for dependence reciprocation (supporting
hypothesis 3a), and this effect is more positive in the short term than in the
long term (supporting hypothesis 3b). That is, dependence reciprocation
takes present alternatives into account (e.g., “is this partner important to me
relative to my current alternative partners?”). After controlling for depen-
dence in the short term, dependence in the long term has no significant ef-
fect. No such effect was predicted, and our focus is on the short-term effect
of dependence.
We did not develop hypotheses for the triad level at this stage. Inmodels 2
and 3,we observe that transitive closure is strongly positive in the long term,
a result that is robust across all models. However, this result fails to discrim-
inate between our two target mechanisms—local generalized exchange or
local status processes—because positive transitive closure is consistent with
bothmechanisms. Cyclic closure could indicate either generalized exchange
(if positive) or status hierarchy (if negative). We observe that it is positive
and significant here, suggesting generalized exchange.Ournext analysiswill
shed more light on both dyad-level and triad-level patterns.EXCHANGE IN COMPETITIVE AND MUTUALISTIC CONTEXTS
Moving beyond studying interorganizational ties to directly theorize and
analyze temporal patterns in exchangebehavior hasallowedus todrawmore889
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Alldeeply on resource dependence theory and organizational theories of em-
beddedness and to explicate temporal implications of both theories. In our
main contribution, we suggested two different mechanisms of reciprocation
and also showed how they depend on history over different time horizons,
with dependence reciprocation operating on contemporaneous exchange
structures and embedding reciprocation operating on long-term histories of
exchange. The unique value of our approach is to afford identification of
these differences.
In this section we examine the same research context and data on Italian
hospitals, butwe exploit an important formof heterogeneity in patient trans-
fers to further validate the theory and demonstrate the value of the method.
On the basis of our extensive fieldwork, we propose that interhospital pa-
tient transfers within the same clinical specialty are driven by different log-
ics of exchange than transfers across specialties. Let us define these terms:
Across-specialty transfers occur when hospital A sends a patient from one
specialty at hospital A to a different specialty at hospital B (transferring to
receive a different kind of care).
Within-specialty transfers occur from hospital A to hospital B within
the same care specialty (providing equivalent and potentially competing
services).
We present hypotheses and results separately for these two kinds of ex-
change. In considering this form of heterogeneity in kinds of patient trans-
fers, we do not aim to show that our results are robust to this heterogeneity.
Instead, we show that findings depend on this heterogeneity in systematic
ways that support and validate the theory. In order to employ richer data on
treatment specialties, the following analyses focus on 2005–7 because de-
tailed specialty data are not available for 2003–4. There appear to be no sys-
tematic differences in the structure of exchanges or the operation of ex-
change processes, so we employ the longer time period and larger data set
for the previous analysis that did not require specialty-level data. (Replicat-
ing the previous analysis restricting to 2005–7 yields the same results.)Exchange in Complementary Service Domains
(Transfers across Specialties)
Transfers between hospitals across specialties, such when as a juvenile
heart patient in pediatrics at hospital A is transferred to a cardiology unit
at hospital B, do not signal deference because their services are complemen-
tary. For these complementary transfers,we expect the same dyadic patterns
of embedding inertia (hypotheses 1a and 1b), embedding reciprocation (hy-
potheses 2a and 2b), and dependence reciprocation (hypotheses 3a and 3b)
as we had predicted and observed for the full set of exchanges.890
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Interorganizational ExchangeWe further develop predictions at the triad level. For these complemen-
tary transfers across clinical specialties, we expect generalized exchange at
the triad level, implying the following two specific hypotheses:
HYPOTHESIS 4a.—In across-specialty transfer choices, triadic patterns in
patient transfers will exhibit (a tendency toward) transitive closure. The
more hospital i transfers to hospital k and hospital k transfers to hospital
j, the more hospital i will send across-specialty transfers to hospital j.
HYPOTHESIS 4b.—In across-specialty transfer choices, triadic patterns in
patient transfers will exhibit (a tendency toward) cyclic closure. The more
hospital j transfers to hospital k and hospital k transfers to hospital i, the
more hospital i will send across-specialty transfers to hospital j.
Again, it is not necessary that hospitals monitor patient exchanges among
third-party hospitals (although this information is available to them) for
these triad closure patterns to obtain. We have described how the gradual
embedding of the transfer process may develop through organizational em-
bedding (operating routines, communication channels, contact lists, famil-
iarity among staff, habits, and the like), and some of these adhesions spread
to third parties just as they operate reciprocally (for embedding inertia and
embedding reciprocation). Table 3 presents relational event models to test
the six dyadic and two triadic hypotheses for choices to transfer across spe-
cialties.
The findings for embedding reciprocation and dependence reciprocation
inacross-specialty transferchoicesaresubstantivelysimilar to thosereported
for all exchanges. Model 4 shows that embedding inertia and embedding
reciprocation are generally positivebut consistentlymorepositive in the long
term than in the short term (supporting hypotheses 1a, 1b, 2a, and 2b),
whereas model 5 shows that dependence reciprocation also operates but
more in the short term (supporting hypotheses 3a and 3b). Again, we are in-
terested in documenting embedding reciprocation and showing that it op-
erates more strongly in the longer term and documenting dependence re-
ciprocation and showing that operates more in the short term. Whether
embeddingreciprocation is still significant in the short termordependencere-
ciprocation is still significant in the long term is not theoretically important.
Models 4 and 5 show positive transitive closure (hypothesis 4a) and pos-
itive cyclic closure (hypothesis 4b) for across-specialty transfers. The combi-
nation of positive transitive and cyclic closure at the triad level leads to a pat-
tern of clustered generalized exchange at the population level.
For the case of complementary exchange (across-specialty transfers, with
minimal direct competition), we thus see the same patterns of reciprocation
that we identified in the main part of this article: embedding reciprocation
operates more strongly on the long-term and dependence reciprocation op-
erates more strongly on the short-term time horizon. Net of dyadic effects,891
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Parameter Estimates of Relational Event Models for
Across-Specialty Transfers between 2005 and 2007
Model 4 Model 5
ariable of theoretical interest:
Long term:
Embedding inertia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29** (.02) .26** (.02)
Embedding reciprocation . . . . . . . . . . . . .19** (.02)
Dependence reciprocation. . . . . . . . . . . . .02 (.01)
Transitive closure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24** (.02) .23** (.02)
Cyclic closure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21** (.03) .11** (.03)
Short term . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Embedding inertia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .03** (.01) .03* (.01)
Embedding reciprocation . . . . . . . . . . . . .03* (.01)
Dependence reciprocation. . . . . . . . . . . . .03** (.01)
rganizational control:
Size sender. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.68** (.14) 1.50** (.14)
Size difference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.79** (.15) 2.52** (.14)
Occupancy recipient . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.08 (.09) 2.16 (.09)
Occupancy difference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.03 (.09) 2.07 (.09)
Inefficiency recipient. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.02 (.04) .00 (.04)
Inefficiency difference. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.11* (.05) 2.09* (.04)
Geographic distance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.57** (.06) 2.66** (.06)
Niche overlap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11** (.03) .08* (.03)
Service differentiation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.06 (.04) .04 (.04)
Same LHU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.11** (.10) 1.37** (.10)
Both urban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .66** (.08) .64** (.08)
Sender urban. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22.26** (.25) 22.48** (.26)
Recipient urban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .07 (.27) .27 (.27)
Both public . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.47** (.52) 2.49** (.52)
Sender public . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21.52** (.51) 21.93** (.51)
Recipient public . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 (.46) .63 (.46)
In-house capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.92** (.04) 2.90** (.04)
Bribery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.55** (.34) 3.90** (.34)
Sender teaching. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45 (.24) .74** (.24)
Recipient teaching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .46* (.18) .41* (.18)
ndogenous structural control:
Long term:
Popularity sender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.15 (.08) .01 (.08)
Activity sender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.03 (.06) .01 (.06)
Popularity recipient. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.10 (.06) 2.01 (.06)
Activity recipient. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.06 (.05) 2.10* (.05)
Short term:
Popularity sender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.03 (.05) .05 (.05)
Activity sender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .08* (.04) .10** (.04)
Popularity recipient. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .03 (.04) .05 (.04)
Activity recipient. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.03 (.04) 2.03 (.04)
oodness of fit:
Null deviance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23,732
Residual deviance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13,968 14,066
Observed events (potential events). . . . . . . 1,736 (1,612,744)This content downloaded from 144.173.023.0
 use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Co38 on March 15, 2019 03
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Interorganizational Exchangewe see the predicted pattern of generalized exchange at the triad level in
positive transitive and cyclic closure.Exchange in Competitive Service Domains (Transfers within Specialties)
Hospitals should only engage in transfers that benefit the patient, and these
elective inpatient transfers represent patients who already have a bed in the
same specialty at the sending hospital. Thus, in contrast to across-specialty
transfers, within-specialty transfers imply a public signal by hospital i that
hospital j will offer the patient superior care. Thus, in addition to the fi-
nancial costs of losing a patient, sending within-specialty transfers entails
a greater reputational cost. We have no reason to believe that the processes
of embedding and dependence reciprocation are deactivated for within-
specialty exchanges. However, we note that a logic of strict meritocracy
(based on objective quality of care or of socially constructed reputation or
both) is in conflict with reciprocation for within-specialty inpatient trans-
fers, and we expect this logic of meritocracy to dominate the transfer pro-
cess for within-specialty exchange, blocking all reciprocation and cyclic clo-
sure and replacing generalized exchange with a strict merit hierarchy.
HYPOTHESIS 5.—Forwithin-specialty transfer choices there will be no em-
bedding reciprocation, either in the short term or in the long term.
HYPOTHESIS 6.—For within-specialty transfer choices there will be no de-
pendence reciprocation, either in the short term or in the long term.
HYPOTHESIS 7a.—For within-specialty transfer choices, triadic patterns
in patient transfers will exhibit transitive closure. The more hospital i trans-
fers to hospital k and hospital k transfers to hospital j, the more hospital i
will send within-specialty transfers to hospital j.
HYPOTHESIS 7b.—For within-specialty transfer choices, triadic patterns
in patient transfers will exhibit negative cyclic closure. The more hospital
j transfers to hospital k and hospital k transfers to hospital i, the less hospital
i will send within-specialty transfers to hospital j.
Note that positive transitive closure (hypotheses 4a and 7a) leads to clus-
tering, which can be consistent with either generalized exchange or hierar-
chy. However, positive cyclic closure (hypothesis 4b) generates local gen-
eralized exchange, while negative cyclic closure (hypothesis 7b) generates
local hierarchy.
Table 4 presents relational event models to test these two dyadic and two
triadic hypotheses for within-specialty transfers. For the case of deference/
competition (where transferring patients implies superiority), we do not see
reciprocation for either embedding (supporting hypothesis 5) or dependence
(supporting hypothesis 6) reciprocation. Embedding reciprocation never
matters, and dependence reciprocation does not matter in the short term893
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Parameter Estimates of Relational Event Models for
Within-Specialty Transfers between 2005 and 2007
Model 6 Model 7
ariable of theoretical interest:
Long term:
Embedding inertia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35** (.04) .37** (.04)
Embedding reciprocation . . . . . . . . . . . .03 (.06)
Dependence reciprocation. . . . . . . . . . . 2.14** (.03)
Transitive closure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24** (.03) .22** (.03)
Cyclic closure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.05 (.06) 2.07 (.06)
Short term:
Embedding inertia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .00 (.02) .01 (.02)
Embedding reciprocation . . . . . . . . . . . .01 (.03)
Dependence reciprocation. . . . . . . . . . . 2.01 (.02)
rganizational control:
Size sender. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.02** (.28) .89** (.27)
Size difference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21.06** (.27) 21.15** (.27)
Occupancy recipient . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25 (.22) .14 (.22)
Occupancy difference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20 (.19) .07 (.19)
Inefficiency recipient. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.24 (.15) 2.29 (.15)
Inefficiency difference. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.30 (.19) 2.30 (.19)
Geographic distance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.05 (.10) 2.05 (.10)
Niche overlap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .08 (.08) .06 (.08)
Service differentiation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.43** (.07) 2.41** (.07)
Same LHU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .91** (.19) 1.47** (.20)
Both urban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.79** (.15) 2.82** (.15)
Sender urban. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.38 (.43) 2.042 (.44)
Recipient urban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21.05* (.47) 21.09* (.48)
Both public . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .61 (1.10) .78 (1.11)
Sender public . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .81 (1.11) .83 (1.11)
Recipient public . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29 (1.10) .25 (1.10)
In-house capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.01** (.27) 2.04** (.27)
Bribery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.27** (.56) 1.78** (.56)
Sender teaching. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.64 (.38) 2.62 (.38)
Recipient teaching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .52 (.31) .55 (.31)
ndogenous structural control:
Long term:
Popularity sender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22 (.16) .31* (.16)
Activity sender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .09 (.09) .13 (.09)
Popularity recipient. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .04 (.12) .03 (.117)
Activity recipient. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.18* (.09) 2.14 (.087)
Short term:
Popularity sender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.18 (.11) 2.15 (.11)
Activity sender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16* (.07) .15* (.07)
Popularity recipient. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .06 (.06) .07 (.07)
Activity recipient. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .07 (.07) .06 (.07)
oodness of fit:
Null deviance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7,628
Residual deviance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,337 4,323
Observed events (potential events). . . . . . 558 (518,382)This content downloaded from 144.173.023
 use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and C.038 on March 15, 2019 0
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Interorganizational Exchangeand is sometimes negative in the long term. That is, i is less likely to send
within-specialty transfers to j if i receives a great proportion of incoming
transfers from j. This strongly supports hypothesis 6 and again suggests that
meritocratic hierarchy is the overarching logic for within-specialty ex-
changes. Although we did not predict that dependence reciprocation would
be dampened much more than embedding reciprocation for within-specialty
exchange, this makes sense from the interpretation of the exchange structure
as socially constructed meritocracy. Interpreting patient transfers as defer-
ence for the sender and dominance for the recipient, then i’s negative depen-
dence reciprocation on j means i is reluctant to defer to i’s crucial source of
status. This is to say, reciprocating deference is unlikely overall, but near
the bottom of the pecking order (e.g., if one receives status from only a single
peer), one is particularly unlikely to do so.
Meaningful patterns emerge at the triad level over the long term. Specif-
ically, for within-specialty transfers in competitive contexts, we see positive
transitive closure (hypothesis 7a) just as we had seen for across-specialty
transfers in complementary contexts. Unlike across-specialty transfers, cy-
clic closure is negative as predicted in models 6 and 7 (hypothesis 7b), al-
though this fails to reach statistical significance in these models. This reveals
limited evidence of the microfoundations of hierarchy emergence at the
triad level: if i gives to k and k gives to j, then i also sends deference to j
(supporting hypothesis 7a) and j is not more likely to send deference to i.
The fact that the negative parameter estimate on cyclic closure fails to reach
statistical significance in models 6 and 7 fails to provide full support for hy-
pothesis 7b (i.e., that j is less likely to senddeference to i), but the contrastwith
the significant positive cyclic closure pattern for across-specialty transfers
in models 4 and 5 is notable, as is the negative reciprocation result described
above.
Although it is reasonable to assume that different processes drive the
choices to reciprocate within or across specialties, and this motivates our
modeling those choices separately in tables 3 and 4, we have not assumed
that hospitals keep ledgers of other hospitals’ transfers and differentiate
within- and across-specialty transfers in that perceived network. We have
conservatively assumed that gradual processes of embedding through re-
peated interaction occur similarly for within- and across-specialty transfers
and that the distinct choices to transfer patients within and across special-
ties operate within a single overarching structure of exchanges for all peer
hospitals, even as they respond differently to that structure. If we assume
that within- and across-specialty transfers are separate networks (i.e., hos-
pital i’s choice to reciprocate to hospital jwithin specialty attends only to j’s
and k’s within-specialty transfers, which requires strong assumptions about
hospitals’ monitoring and keeping track of each other’s transfers), then re-895
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Allsults are similar overall, but the long-term cyclic closure forwithin-specialty
transfers is statistically significant (negative) as predicted.We conservatively
report the weaker result that does not require such strong assumptions.
To recapitulate our comparison of exchange in competitive (within-
specialty) and mutualistic (across-specialty) contexts: for complementary
transfer choices across specialties, we observe reciprocation at the dyad level
and transitive and cyclic closure at the triad level, which together lead to
generalized exchange at the population level. For deference transfer choices
within specialties, we observe no reciprocation (or even antireciprocation)
at the dyad level, andwe see transitive closurewithout cyclic closure (or even
negative cyclic closure), which collectively suggest hierarchy formation at
the population level.CONSIDERING COMPETITION OVER GEOGRAPHIC DISTANCE
In the main analysis of patient transfers, we developed a theory of interor-
ganizational exchange that differentiated embedding and dependence recip-
rocation and showed that embedding operates over long time horizons (re-
sponds to long-term history) and dependence operates contemporaneously
(responds to short-term history) in patient flows. In a follow-up analysis
above, we considered exchange in two different contexts—transfers within
service specialties (competitive contexts, where transfers are taken as a sign
of deference) and across service specialties (in complementary or nonover-
lapping contexts, where transfers can represent cooperation). Supporting our
interpretation of embedding and dependence reciprocation, this extension
to heterogeneity in exchange behaved in an intelligible manner. For com-
plementary transfers (across specialties), we observe reciprocation follow-
ing the same patterns that we had described and discussed in the primary
analysis: embedding over the long term and dependence in the short term,
with generalized exchange at the population level. For deference transfers
(within specialties), we do not observe reciprocation. The structure of ex-
changes appears to be unidirectional at the dyad level, and transitive (not
cyclic) at the triad level, implying a basic tendency toward hierarchy. In this
section, we elaborate the analysis and give a further validation of our in-
terpretation, now considering the role of geographic distance in moderat-
ing the two mechanisms of organizational reciprocation (embedding and
dependence).
We earlier reported that no reciprocation occurred in within-specialty
transfers, and we attributed this failure of reciprocation to competition. As
we have detailed location information on these hospitals, we can use geo-
graphic distance between hospitals to verify that the breakdown of recipro-
cation for within-specialty transfers is in fact due to competition. This seems
particularly appropriate in the case we examine because competition in ser-896
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Interorganizational Exchangevice industries (such as hotels, restaurants, and hospitals) is known to atten-
uate with distance (Baum and Mezias 1992; Mascia et al. 2016). If compet-
itive dynamics are indeed the driving force for the lack of reciprocation for
within-specialty transfers, then geographic distance should moderate the
findings we attributed to competition. At short distances, competitive dy-
namics should erase reciprocation for within-specialty transfers (as we found
above), but great distance will attenuate competition, allowing reciprocation
to emerge even within each specialty market.
HYPOTHESIS 8.—Reciprocation will increase with geographic distance for
within-specialty transfers.
We do not report the full tables of coefficients for within-specialty trans-
fers for brevity, but those results are available upon request. To present this
result more intuitively, we plot the predicted multiplier of the exchange rate
as distance increases, for embedding and dependence reciprocation in the
short term versus the long term (see fig. 6).
For within-specialty transfers, we again see that reciprocation appears
to be negligible (multiplier near 1.0) for short-distance or medium-distance
hospital pairs (under about a 40-minute drive). However, over great dis-
tances, reciprocation does in fact emerge even for within-specialty transfers.
Further, this reciprocation at great distances actuallymatches the pattern of
reciprocation that we had reported for the entire population (in table 2) and
for across-specialty transfer choices (in table 3): long-term embedding recip-
rocation and short-term dependence reciprocation are strongest. Support-
ing our interpretation that the failure of reciprocation in within-specialty
transfers had been due to competition, we confirm that increasing geographic
distance (which attenuates competition) restores reciprocation, including the
characteristic pattern of time-dependent reciprocation.
Also supporting that competition is driving the failure of reciprocation
for within-specialty transfers, we did not find that distance increases recip-
rocation for across-specialty transfers. Reciprocal exchange across special-
ties is strong locally and diminishes as distance increases (for short-term and
long-term dependence and short-term embedding), an intuitive pattern due
to greater costs and risks of distant transfers. It is unsurprising that recipro-
cation in complementary patient exchanges is less likely over great distances,
and this result is not relevant to our theory, so we do not focus on this result
here. However, the fact that distance decreases reciprocation for comple-
mentary exchanges provides a contrast that highlights how distance increases
reciprocation for competitive exchanges.CONCLUSION
Previouswork has considered interorganizational networks either as binary
ties among organizations or as time-aggregated flows of resources among897
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Interorganizational Exchangeorganizations. Researchers have typically assumed an equivalence of in-
teraction behavior and observed relationships, having measured one and
taken it as a proxy for the other. We extend that work by directly studying the
interaction behaviors, developing an integrated theory for the structural-
temporal dynamics of interorganizational exchange. Moving from a dyadic/
binary ties perspective to direct analysis of interaction behavior allows us
to consider new kinds of questions, considering for the first time how two
prominent logics of organizational exchange (previously seen as static pat-
terns) fit together dynamically.
Drawing on resource dependence theory and theories of organizational
embeddedness, in our primary contribution we develop and defend the fol-
lowing theoretical claim: when looking at the contemporaneous structure of
interorganizational exchange (recent patterns of giving), organizations tend
to reciprocate resource transfers according to a logic of dependence (i gives
more to peers j that are relatively important sources of resources to i).When
looking over the long-term historical structure of exchange, organizations
tend to give according to a logic of interorganizational embedding (i gives
to peers j that focus their giving on i), whichwe call embedding. At any given
time, the organization’s giving choices reflect these two forces, which operate
as two distinct forms of history dependence on distinct clocks. Developing
and testing novel hypotheses for the temporal dynamics of these two recipro-
cation mechanisms operating on patient exchanges among Italian hospitals,
we show that embedding reciprocation is driven by long-term historical pat-
terns and dependence reciprocation is driven by the contemporaneous struc-
ture (recent history) of exchange.
In our secondary contribution, we investigate a scope condition for the
above theoretical claim about reciprocation. We show how local exchange
dynamics differ in competitive environments, where exchanges may be in-
terpreted as deference by the sender to a superior recipient. Specifically, we
show that competitive intensity (using two distance-based measures) mod-
erates the forces of reciprocation: reciprocation follows the pattern hypoth-
esized above only when competitive intensity is low. As a categorical mea-
sure of competitive intensity, we distinguish patient transfer choices within
service specialties (competitive contexts, where transfersmay be interpreted
as dominance or deference) from transfer choices across specialties (where
transfers may be interpreted as complementarity and cooperative differen-
tiation).We use driving distance between hospitals as an alternative contin-
uous operationalization of competitive intensity, assuming conventionally
that competitive intensity varies inversely with geographic distance. This
supplementary analysis yields consistent conclusions: in contexts where or-
ganizations are located near each other in market space and in geographic
space, competitive interdependence leads a distinct logic of deference/dom-899
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Allinance to overwhelm the above tendencies toward reciprocation, so recipro-
cation does not appear at all. For complementary transfers across specialties
or over great geographic distances, reciprocation does develop and follows
the pattern predicted by our theory: strongest for long-term embedding re-
ciprocation and short-term dependence reciprocation. For across-specialty
exchange (where there is little competition), reciprocation unsurprisingly de-
creases with geographic distance. This interaction with geographic distance
(distance increases reciprocation within markets and decreases reciproca-
tion across markets) strongly supports the theory and its scope condition.
Our third contribution is to suggest how local exchange dynamics can
serve as microfoundations of macrolevel social structures. For example, we
show how local logics of mutualism can lead to population-level generalized
exchange when competitive intensity is low (resource transfers signal col-
laboration) and local status dynamics can lead to hierarchy when compet-
itive intensity is high (resource transfers signal deference). For complemen-
tary resource transfers, we show strong reciprocation at the dyad level and
positive transitive and cyclic closure at the triad level, which leads to gen-
eralized exchange in the population. For deference transfers within compet-
itive contexts, we find no reciprocation (or antireciprocation) for dyads and
transitive closure without cyclic closure for triads, which collectively sug-
gest tendencies toward hierarchy at the population level.We thus show that
the dyadic and triadic patterns in this article will tend to lead to reciproca-
tion and generalized exchange in less competitive contexts and will lead to
linear transitive hierarchies of dominance and deference in more competi-
tive contexts. Thus, competitive intensity determineswhenapopulationwill
develop into generalized exchange (reciprocation, cyclic and positive tran-
sitive exchange) and when a population will develop into hierarchy (no re-
ciprocation, no cyclic exchange, instead transitive dominance relations). Al-
though intuitive, this result has never before been demonstrated with this
level of granularity at the level of temporally situated interorganizational
exchange events.
In fieldwork, we discussed the observed patterns with some physicians
from Lazio, Marche, and Abruzzo. They found our observations of recipro-
cation for across-specialty exchange, as well as nonreciprocation at the dy-
adic level and transitive anticyclic exchange at the triad level, to be intelli-
gible for within-specialty exchange, in terms consistent with our account
here. They explicitly described the expressions of deference that physicians
enact through transferring patients and the status hierarchies that result in
the local population. The one pattern that they found puzzling was the ap-
pearance of positive cyclic closure in exchanges, which we had observed for
across-specialty transfers. This appearance of a regular structure (cyclic ex-
change) outside the awareness of the individuals who enact those patterns900
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Interorganizational Exchangerecalls the findings by Bearman (1997), who also observed robust cyclic ex-
change (transfers of wives among subsections of an aboriginal tribe) in a
population that neither prescribed nor recognized this cyclic pattern. Fur-
ther research is needed to verify this suggestive result.
Our study of temporal-structural dynamics of exchange behavior goes
beyond conventional network analysis and revisits insights from classical
exchange theory, drawing inspiration from qualitative ethnographic field-
work and experimental research on exchange. This new lens allows us to
reincorporate the idea that the event history of exchange may play a crucial
role in the development of exchange structures, an insight that has been too
often ignored because it could not be rigorously considered with conven-
tional social network analysis. Disaggregating the structure of interaction
into the dynamic structure of underlying interaction events also opens a
world of opportunities to examine the content of interaction that constitutes
that structure. For example, McLean (2007) analyzed the text of patronage
letters among Florentines in the Italian Renaissance, showing how tem-
plates developed and were reproduced through the exchange of letters over
time. Similar lenses could be applied to analysis of text in the documents ac-
companying patient transfers. We look forward to future work that will ap-
ply this lens and more nuanced theory to other research contexts.APPENDIX
Additional Information about the Relational Event Model
Model Estimation
In the general (continuous) form of the model each relational event is as-
sumed to have a piecewise constant hazard of occurrence (k) given a partic-
ular history of prior relational events. The piecewise constant rate func-
tion k is assumed to depend on a variety of characteristics of the actors, the
prior history of relational events within some specified sociotemporal en-
velope and exogenous covariates, and is parameterized in the form k 5
exp(∑hhh(uh)i(m)j(m)), where each statistic (uh)i(m)j(m) depends on characteristics
of the actors, the prior history of events relevant to themth event, am5 (i(m),
j(m)) and/or exogenous covariates. The hh are corresponding parameters.
In cases inwhich only the sequence of events is known orwhen the timing
of events is less relevant than the information about the order of the events,
as it is here, Butts (2008) shows that the probability that the mth event will
be next in the sequence is the occurrence rate for that event divided by the
sum of the rates for events (k, l) ∈ Q(m) that might occur, including the mth
event itself. Themodel therefore considers the probability of events that did
occur as well as the probability of events that could have occurred at time t901
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Allbut did not. The probability of the next event in a sequence is described by
the function pðmÞ 5 lm=ðom0lm0 Þ, where km is a rate parameter associated
with event m and the events m0 run over all possible events that may occur
next in the sequence. Hence, full formulation of the function that character-
izes the probability that an event is the next in a sequence is as follows:
exp o
h
vh uhð Þi mð Þj mð Þ
 
o
k,lð Þ∈Q mð Þ
exp o
h
vh uhð Þkl
  , (A1)
with the probability of the sequence of events being
p Atð Þ 5
Y
m
exp o
h
vh uhð Þi mð Þj mð Þ
 
o
k,lð Þ∈Q mð Þ
exp o
h
vh uhð Þkl
 
2
6664
3
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In words, we compute the probability that an event is next in a sequence of
events by comparing its rate of occurrence in the past (as characterized by
the statistics in themodel) to the rate of occurrence of all the potential events
(eq. [A1]). The probability of the sequence itself is the product of the prob-
abilities of each event (eq. [A2]). The final version of the model takes the
form of a familiar conditional logistic regression model (e.g., Agresti 2002),
specifying each event as a stratum within the model.Data Preparation
Our data set is structured as a discrete ordered sequence of relational events
(patient transfer), each ofwhich can be expressed in the form am5 (i(m), j(m))
signifying that the mth event is a patient being sent by hospital i(m) to hos-
pital j(m). The hospitals i(m) and j(m) are members of a known setN(m) rel-
evant at each event (m). (It is also convenient to write Yi(m)j(m)t5 1 to indicate
i(m) sending a patient to j(m) at time t and Yijt 5 0 otherwise; we use this
more precise timing in the computation of statistics). The sequence of events
is assumed to be of lengthM and may be written in the form (a1, a2, . . ., aM).
The sequence of events up to and including themth event may be written as
Am 5 {ah: h ≤ m}. While am 5 (i(m), j(m)) denotes the mth event, we also de-
fined the set of potential events for the mth event as Q(m) 5 {(k,l ): k ≠ l and
k, l ∈ N(m)}. Variable Q(m) then includes the actual mth event and all the
potential events that could have occurred as the mth event. We employed
a custom-developed Java application to compute potential events and rel-902
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Interorganizational Exchangeevant preconfigurations based on the actual events contained in the patient
exchange data set.6
We recorded the transfers as they occurred each day. Because more than
one transfer may occur on the same day and because we did not have the
exact time of day at which each transfer occurred, some transfers are simul-
taneous in our raw data. In fact, there are approximately two transfers per
day, on average. As is standard in event history analysis, we deal with such
simultaneous events by randomizing the sequence of eventswithin each day.
Although this introduces a minor source of error due to uncertainty about
the true order of events within a particular day, such tiny differences (due
to time perturbations of hours or minutes) can hardly affect results on our
time horizons of months and years; indeed, sensitivity tests showed no
change in results for replications of this random assignment. Also, the trans-
fer process for individual patients takes many hours, so the exact timing
within the day is arbitrary, and we found no evidence of statistical depen-
dence for transfers on such a short time horizon (i.e., hospitals do not recip-
rocate patient transfers on the same day).Alternative Consideration of the Risk Set
The models presented in the article use a set of potential events (or risk set)
composed of all potential dyadic combinations between all hospitals in the
sample. That is, any hospital could conceivably send a patient to any other
hospital, even if the sending or receiving hospital does not have a distinct
clinical specialty unit that matches the patient’s actual admission category
at the sender or receiver. An alternative version would be to assume that
only hospitals that include the exact named clinical specialty of the actual
sender could have sent the patient and only hospitals that have the specialty
of the actual recipient could have received the patient. We replicated the
analysis with this “restricted” risk set—composed of all hospital pairs where
the potential sender (receiver) has a named specialty unit of the actual sender
(receiver)—and results are robust. We report the unrestricted version not
only because it is simpler andmore parsimonious but also because assuming
that only a hospital with specific named specialty unit could send or receive
a patient is a very strong (and not always reasonable) assumption. In fact,
hospitals may admit and treat patients even if they do not have a specific
named specialty unit (such as neonatology or neonatal intensive care),
and patients often havemultiple intersectingmedical problems and features
that could apply to a number of different specialties (e.g., a child with a sim-6 The code used to calculate the statistics and to estimate the model are available on re-
quest from Eric Quintane. It is also possible to estimate relational event models using the
relevent package in R; see Marcum and Butts (2015).
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Allple sports injury could be evaluated and sent to orthopedics and trauma,
sports medicine, pediatric surgery, or surgery at various hospitals, depend-
ing on the judgment of the sender). Patient transfers are complex decisions
that involve ambiguity and human judgment, and leave open the possibility
that social processes (such as organizational reciprocation, generalized ex-
change, and status behavior) may be part of the story. It is notable that our
results are similar whether we use the extreme restricted risk set or the un-
restricted risk set. In another robustness check, we used the unrestricted risk
set but included dummy variables to indicate whether the potential sender
includes a clinical specialty matching the patient’s admission in the actual
sender hospital and another dummy variable indicating whether the poten-
tial recipient includes a specialty unit matching the patient’s admission in
the actual recipient hospital. Again, results were the same. Thus, we are in
no way concerned that our results for social process of interorganizational
exchange are an artifact of the structure of organizational specialties or ca-
pabilities.REFERENCES
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